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Mor e Than a Passing Fad
G. Philip Hughes
em em ber the Summit 
of the Americas? A 
year ago, President 
Clinton and the presi­
dents and prim e min­
isters of 33 other 
nations from the Western 
Hem isphere gathered in Miami for 
a m eeting whose goal, President 
Clinton said, was “to create a whole 
new architecture for the relation­
ship between the nations and the 
peoples of the Am ericas> to ensure 
that dichos become hechos, that 
words are tu rned  into deeds.”
The Miami Summit was in tended  
to be -  and was -  different from 
the previous meetings of Western 
H em isphere leaders in 1956 and 
1967. For one thing, all the leaders 
attending were democratically 
elected; a fact which underscored 
Cuba’s isolation as the last rem ain­
ing dictatorship in Latin America. 
For another, leaders from the more 
recently independent nations of 
the Caribbean were included.
Perhaps the two most im portant 
differences from the past summits 
were these: The Summit leaders 
reached consensus on negotiating a 
Free Trade Area of the Americas by 
2005 and they agreed that this 
Summit -  unlike its predecessors -  
would no t end  with pious declara­
tions but with a disciplined follow- 
up program  of action.
The goal of a Free Trade Area of 
the Americas, adopted just a year 
after the ratification of NAFTA 
accord with Mexico and Canada, 
was sweeping, ambitious and vision-
Ambassador G. Philip Hughes is 
managing director of the Council 
of the Americas
ary. Its adoption reflected the pro­
found transform ation that had 
occurred in U.S.-Latin American 
relations over last decade. By con­
trast, the last time the Western 
H em isphere’s leaders m et -  at 
Punta del Este, Lruguay in 1967 -  
the U.S. was pointedly left out of 
the Latin American Common 
M arket which the leaders planned 
to com plete by 1980.
A year has now passed since the 
ringing declarations and bright 
prom ise of the Miami Summit. I t’s 
time to take stock of what has been 
achieved and what remains to be 
done to reach the goals our leaders 
set.
At one level, the “Summit follow- 
up process” -  as it is bureaucratical­
ly dubbed -  is a great process. 
Perhaps typical of governm ent pro­
grams, the process is doing well 
what governm ents do best: a myri­
ad o f working groups, symposia, 
im plem entation review groups, 
ministerial meetings and such dis­
cussing, reviewing, recom m ending, 
drafting, revising, resubm itting and 
so forth  on recom m ended actions 
for each o f the Sum m it’s 23 -  count 
them, 23 -  main goals.
O f course, not all Summit goals 
are created equal. Some have 
received and probably are destined 
to receive scant attention, while the 
goal of hem ispheric trade liberal­
ization -  the very centerpiece of 
the Summit -  has been the focus of 
very deliberate work. In this sense, 
the “Summit process” is working.
Indeed, policy wonks and trade 
gurus in both  the private and pub­
lic sector can take satisfaction in 
the fact that a m eeting of the hem i­
sphere’s trade ministers in Denver 
last June set up seven (of 11
planned) working groups to chart 
the course of building a hem ispher­
ic free trade area. Moreover, they 
can also look with satisfaction on 
the fact that these working groups 
will all have m et at least twice 
before the trade ministers m eeting 
held in Colombia in March.
As sheer process, then, this is 
wonderful -  and at one level- nec­
essary “stuff.” But in the year since 
President Clinton claimed his polit­
ical and foreign policy victory at 
the Miami Summit, what substan­
tively has been accom plished to 
advance the goal o f a Free Trade 
Area of the Americas? Not that 
much.
While the C linton Adm inistration 
never spelled out its long-range 
game plan or strategy for reaching 
the hem ispheric Free Trade Area 
goal, it had one straightforward 
and m odest goal after the adoption 
of NAFTA: to reach an agreem ent 
to bring Chile into NAFTA in 1995.
No one disputes the fact that 
Chile’s economic reform s make it 
the most qualified Latin American 
candidate to jo in  NAFTA. With 
economic growth rates averaging 
more that 6 percent from 1990 to
1994, the Chileans have vanquished 
inflation, m aintained stable curren­
cy, thoroughly privatized state- 
owned enterprises, and brought 
about a num ber of necessary mar- 
ket-opening reforms. Because of 
these advances -  and with very few 
economic sectors directly com peti­
tive with domestic U.S. industries -  
many thought that Chile had a bet­
ter case for NAFTA m em bership 
than Mexico. Indeed, many policy 
makers today believe that C hile’s 
m em bership in NAFTA would be a 
fitting valediction for its successful
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A look at the Summit of the Americas one year later
transition from the P inochet dicta­
torship to democracy.
But where do we stand in taking 
this next, historic step toward build­
ing a free trade community am ong 
our neighbors in this hem isphere? 
Unfortunately, about the same 
place as a year ago. It seems that in 
the m onths since the Summit of 
the Americas, interest group poli­
tics and presidential electioneering 
have delayed, if not derailed, the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas 
agenda. And both  the Congress 
and the president are at fault.
The Clinton Adm inistration, in 
seeking congressional approval for 
“fast track" negotiating authority, 
has insisted that it be empowered 
to include agreem ents on the labor 
and environm ental standards -  
backed up by the possibility of 
trade sanctions -  in any agreem ent 
on which Congress would then 
have only a yes or no vote. While 
on Capitol Hill, the Republican 
majority in Congress has been 
unwilling to further solidify the 
precedent that trade agreem ents 
should be vehicles for imposing 
U.S. social agendas on o ther friend­
ly, dem ocratic nations. Like the 
earlier debate over NAFTA, the 
Congress and the president are 
once again locked in debate over 
w hether social issues should take 
precedence in economic negotia­
tions.
To date, despite several honest 
broker attem pts to craft a com pro­
mise, the impasse on this issue 
seems com plete. And as the U.S. 
enters a presidential election year, 
this situation may suit everyone’s 
political interests ju st fine.
For the C linton adm inistration, 
insisting on a linkage between
future trade agreem ents with Chile
-  or any o ther country -  and sanc­
tions on labor and environm ental 
standards, pleases its core labor and 
environm ental constituencies. And 
if the adm inistration’s insistence on 
these conditions held up any agree­
m ent during the election year, 
these same constituencies probably 
wouldn’t mind; almost by defini­
tion, they are no t big advocates of 
open markets and free trade.
The Republicans too have little to 
lose if the trade agreem ent with 
Chile should fall by the wayside. 
Failing to reach agreem ent with the 
Clinton adm inistration on new 
trade negotiating authority could 
keep the divisive issue of trade lib­
eralization -  which pits protection­
ist-populist conservatives against 
free m arket economic conservatives
-  off the campaign trail. Moreover, 
it would deny President Clinton a 
trade victory in an election year.
Perhaps this is the reason why 
majority leader and presidential 
candidate Bob Dole has had a 
change of heart backing the Free 
Trade for the Americas initiative.
As Senator Dole -  who earlier 
worked hard  to round  up votes for 
NAFTA and for the Uruguay 
Round GATT agreem ent -  recently 
declared on the Senate floor, “We 
need to step back from this 
unprecedented  whirlwind of new 
trade agreem ents” ... and “focus on 
our domestic house, on the actions 
we can take here at hom e that will 
improve our global competitive­
ness.”
O f course, political am bition on 
both  ends o f Pennsylvania Avenue 
is not the only reason for the stale­
mate on the building of a Hemi­
spheric free trade zone. In the
wake of Mexico’s peso crisis, it is 
understandable that last year’s 
unbridled enthusiasm  for free trade 
expansion in the Americas should 
be considerably tem pered. No one 
can watch the currency of one of 
our largest trading partners plum ­
met over 60 percent in value in a 
year without being sobered.
In this climate, it’s easy to lose 
sight of the fact that none of this 
has anything to do with NAFTA.
The peso crisis was the result of 
poor m anagem ent by the Mexican 
governm ent of its spending and 
in ternational borrowing. It could 
have happened  with or without 
NAFTA, with similar results.
Having NAFTA in place is proba­
bly helping both the U.S. and 
Mexico weather the peso crisis 
m ore effectively. On the Mexican 
side, it has locked Mexico into a 
correct strategy of growing out of 
its econom ic crisis, ra ther than clos­
ing its economy to im ports and 
trade as it did during its financial 
crisis o f the early 1980s. For the 
U.S., having NAFTA in place has 
helped preserve U.S. exports to 
Mexico. Even in the midst of 
M exico’s worst m odern economic 
crisis, U.S. exports to Mexico 
rem ain above pre-NAFTA levels.
Overall, given the peso crisis and 
the presidential posturing, it is easy 
to lose sight of what is at stake for 
the U.S. in the effort to build a 
Free Trade Area of the Americas. 
Simply put, the following is at 
stake: in a region that for genera­
tions has regarded the U.S. and its 
business and econom ic interests 
with fear and suspicion, that has 
periodically nationalized, taxed, 
restricted or otherwise tried to limit 
U.S. business penetration of many
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of its markets, the opportunity for 
a real, enduring  opening is at 
hand.
T hroughout Latin America, coun­
tries that once pursued closed eco­
nomic systems are tu rning away 
from their old models and em brac­
ing policies of privatization and 
openness to foreign investment and 
trade. In fact, as free trade has 
been found to bring in its wake 
lower prices, jo b  creation, greater 
consum er satisfaction, innovation 
and growth, our southern neigh­
bors are actively liberalizing their 
trading arrangem ent with each 
other. MERCOSUR, a customs 
union of Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay, is presently 
negotiating with Chile, Bolivia, and 
even the European U nion to liber­
alize m arket access.
Thus, our European com petitors 
could easily attain free m arket 
access to the entire South 
American m arket before the U.S. 
and its NAFTA partners. We simply 
cannot afford to be left behind; the 
cost to our economy would be 
trem endous. As the late 
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown 
said last June in Denver, “We know 
that free trade brings greater pros­
perity. The U.S. alone stands to 
create 2 million more jobs as Latin 
America incomes continue to climb 
and U.S. exports increase over the 
next eight years.”
With the stalemate of progress on 
free trade negotiations with Chile, 
the m om entum  of the Miami 
Summit o f the Americas is being 
lost. With it we risk losing the his­
toric opportunity to replace genera- 
tions-old suspicions about U.S. busi­
ness interests in Latin America with 
a climate of openness and partner­
ship. Equally im portant, we risk los­
ing the resulting economic growth 
potential for all the societies of the 
hem isphere.
O ur leaders in the Congress and 
the White House should not let this 
opportunity  fall by the wayside. ■
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A Mat t er  of  Deconstruction
Jean Grugel and Anthony Payne
he concept of “Latin 
America and the 
Caribbean” (LAC) is 
dead; long live a vision 
of “the Americas” with 
many different com po­
nen t parts. That is to dramatize, 
but not to distort, the conclusion to 
which we have been inexorably 
drawn as a result of research under­
taken at the University of Sheffield 
in England over the last two years. 
We have been working as part of a 
team investigating the em ergence of 
a num ber of regionalist projects in 
the contem porary world order and 
have focused our attention on the 
implications for the LAC countries 
of the recent and im portant U.S. 
turn  toward a form of regionalism 
in its own hem isphere. This shift of 
U.S. policy impacts the economic 
shape of the LAC region. O ur full 
conclusions are set forth in our 
respective chapters in Andrew 
Gamble and Anthony Payne (eds), 
Regionalism and World Order, pub­
lished by St. M artin’s Press in New 
York in March 1996. What follows 
here is the broad outline of the 
argum ent we make.
The necessary starting point is a 
sense of the variations in the rela­
tively long history of U.S. relations 
with the rest of the Americas. The 
key point is that the politics of the 
recent past (defined as the Cold 
War period) have been distinctive, 
not typical. They were character-
Jean Grugel is lecturer in politics and 
Anthony Payne is professor of politics 
at the University of Sheffield in 
England. They have recently collabo­
rated on a study of regional blocfor- 
viation in the Americas.
ized by the way in which the U.S. 
perceived itself as a hegemonic 
power and associated its credibility 
in the eyes of both its enemies and 
allies in all parts of the world with 
its capacity to maintain and dem on­
strate control of its own hem ispher­
ic community -  its “backyard.”
The control of drug 
trafficking is not made 
easier by the freeing 
of markets; and 
environmentalism 
challenges many of the 
favored prescriptions of 
the Washington-driven 
neoliberal economic 
consensus.
Viewed historically, however, this 
period constitutes one of several dif­
ferent phases which can be detected 
in the unfolding of U.S. policy with­
in the Americas. Broadly, these 
reflect a progression in the U.S. 
position from national consolida­
tion in the 19th century; to the 
assertion of regional power status in 
the Caribbean and Central America 
in the first 30 years of this century; 
to a tentative wider embrace of 
(unequal) partnership with Latin 
America from the mid-1930s to the 
mid-1940s; to the acquisition after 
1945 of a globally hegemonic posi­
tion with all its attendant symbolic 
ramifications for the whole of the 
hemisphere; and finally to the ulti­
mately unsuccessful reassertion of
that hegemony under Reagan in the 
1980s. From such a perspective, the 
Cold War years stand not as an 
exemplar or a norm , but merely as 
an episode.
Moreover, this era was novel in 
the longer history of U.S. relations 
within the Americas in that the 
imperatives of global hegemony 
required the U.S. to have a strategic 
concern for all developments in all 
parts of the hemisphere. Nowhere 
was too small, no incident too 
insignificant, to draw a U.S. 
response, provided that it could be 
connected to the global agenda.
For the first time, therefore, U.S. 
foreign policy treated the whole 
region as if it was a coherent unit.
In o ther words, it was the U.S. -  not 
the regional states themselves -  
which created our contem porary 
understanding of “Latin America 
and the Caribbean” as a region. It 
did so for reasons of national advan­
tage in the very specific context of 
the Cold War. Quite obviously, it 
did not develop the concept in 
order to facilitate the integration or 
liberation of LAC. Indeed, the con­
sequence for the countries of LAC 
was an enforced prioritization of 
their relations with Washington and 
the establishment of very tight 
boundaries within which they could 
pursue their own developmental 
goals. The Cold War years are of 
obvious im portance and not only 
because they are the immediate 
backdrop to the present. But now 
that they have passed, new consider­
ations bear upon the making of U.S. 
policy for its own hem isphere. In 
order to understand what these pre­
sent trends are, we need to think in 
a more fluid way than the LAC con­
cept allows.
6 Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Two
0 R T S
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There certainly cannot be any 
doubt that the U.S. has been partic­
ularly active in relating to LAC 
states in a variety of policy areas 
since the beginning of the 1990s, 
and that relations between the U.S. 
and the rest of the Americas are 
closer now than for many years. As 
the Miami Summit of the Americas 
showed, the dom inant political dis­
course in the region is currently 
characterized by notions of “part­
nership, synergy and cooperation.” 
Old Cold War concepts like “threat, 
war and subversion” have been de­
emphasized. It is also necessary to 
concede that the Bush administra­
tion, so often derided for its lack of 
vision, developed a distinctive view 
of the way it wanted LAC to develop 
over the final years of this century. 
In that sense, the Enterprise for the 
Americas bids can be seen as a gen­
uinely historic speech which picked 
up existing trends and assembled 
them  into a new agenda for the 
Americas. In more theoretical 
terms, it can be said to represent 
the initiation of a U.S. project to 
offset the loss of global hegemony 
(which, as already indicated, the 
Reagan adm inistration had unsuc­
cessfully tried to reclaim) by the 
establishment of a regional hegemo­
ny in the Americas across economic, 
security and ideological agendas.
To begin with, the Clinton adm in­
istration was slow to see the implica­
tions and benefits of such a project, 
bu t it eventually caught up and has 
now etched out a policy framework 
for the Americas which links free 
trade, democracy and security in a 
more direct fashion than Bush ever 
managed. In short, Bush and 
Clinton have been able to advance 
quite significantly the regional pro­
jec t set out in the Enterprise for the 
Americas. Nevertheless, our 
research suggests that they have not 
fully succeeded in engineering a 
U.S. regional hegemony across the 
Americas. In fact, there are good 
reasons for believing that something 
of a high tide may have already have 
been reached and that the trend of 
U.S. policy over the rem aining years 
of the decade may accordingly be 
one of retreat and growing difficul­
ty. Three reasons stand out in our 
argument, two of which will be 
briefly highlighted and one 
explored in slightly greater depth 
since it relates directly to the disin­
tegration o f the concept of LAC.
The U.S. remains the hub of 
the new Americas, but it has 
not created and almost 
certainly does not need to 
create an even regional 
hegemony across all parts 
of the hemisphere.
First, there are real contradictions 
between the contem porary econom ­
ic and security agendas developed 
by the U.S. for the Americas. Put 
starkly, economic liberalization and 
democratization, which appear as 
com plem entary from W ashington’s 
perspective, are in fact far from 
comfortable bedfellows. Notwith­
standing the rhetoric to the con­
trary, the control of drug trafficking 
is not made easier by the freeing of 
markets; and environmentalism, if 
taken seriously, challenges many of
the favored prescriptions of the 
Washington-driven neoliberal eco­
nomic consensus.
Second, the U.S. Americas project 
is not grounded domestically on a 
firm social and political base. The 
fact is that the regionalist option has 
been deployed in U.S. politics by a 
variety of groups for different, often 
mutually exclusive, reasons and the 
many contradictions that this has 
entailed have not been worked 
through, let alone resolved. The 
coalitions that passed NAFTA or 
supported the invasion of Haiti 
were, at best, fragile. At worst, as 
the debate about Proposition 187 in 
California shows, the policy issues of 
the Americas have the capacity to 
penetrate and divide U.S. society 
and politics in a very harm ful fash­
ion. Either way, the increasingly 
fragm ented nature of the U.S. 
state/society complex in the mid- 
1990s does not augur well for the 
further and full developm ent of the 
wider enterprise for the Americas 
initially set out by Bush.
Third, it had become apparent 
during the course of the last few 
years that the U.S. is no t equally 
concerned with all parts of the 
Americas. It does not have to take 
a view of LAC as a whole -  some­
thing which it felt necessary to do 
by way of example in the era of 
global hegemony -  and it accord­
ingly draws increasingly im portant 
distinctions between its policies 
toward different parts of the form er 
LAC region.
This is the facet of our research 
that we want to stress and explore a 
little further in the rem ainder of 
this article. For what has em erged 
in the last few years is a reordering 
of U.S. involvement based on the
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evolution of two new “m aps” and 
the form er does not relate easily or 
neatly to the latter. Washington in 
effect now has only fragm ented 
dem ands to make upon LAC states: 
the need to resolve immigration 
problems with others and the neces­
sity to control drugs flows from and 
through still others. Put another 
way, there are both winners and 
losers within the old LAC as a con­
sequence of the new regionalist 
policies of the U.S., and it is an 
im portant part of developing a 
more nuanced understanding of 
relations within the Americas that 
this is fully grasped.
The new economic map favors 
Mexico in the most obvious way.
Not only is it a m em ber of NAFTA, 
but that m em bership enables it to 
play a key role in the im plem enta­
tion or obstruction of any future 
plans to extend hemispheric free 
trade. O ther potential beneficiaries 
include Chile, which was promised 
free trade talks before anybody else 
as a reward for its early program  of 
liberalization and has lately been 
given a target date for NAFTA acces­
sion of January 1, 1997. Through 
their mem bership in the Group of 
Three with Mexico, both Venezuela 
and Colombia also edge closer by 
proxy to the U.S. m arket and 
toward a U.S. seal of approval. By 
contrast, o ther members of the 
Andean Pact, such as Peru and 
Bolivia, have been left to plum m et 
into recession and would struggle to 
compete within a putative hem i­
spheric free trade bloc. Caribbean 
and Central American countries are 
severely damaged, at least relatively, 
by the advent of NAFTA and have 
resorted to making a case for parity 
with Mexican terms of entry into 
the U.S. market, a strategy that can 
only succeed if they can find some 
way of regaining their form er Cold 
War priority in Washington. The 
only potential challenge to this U.S.- 
drawn map is to be found within the 
MERCOSUR countries. Brazil has
flirted with the idea of trying to 
build an alternative subregional 
bloc organized around a South 
American Free Trade Area 
(SAFTA), but the latest signs are 
that it is already backing away from 
this prospect.
The new security map of the 
Americas is rather different, but 
equally uneven. The issues which 
the U.S. currently defines as central 
to its security -  immigration, the 
environm ent and drugs -  require 
the design of policies to be applied 
above all on the periphery o f the 
new political economy, namely the 
Caribbean, Central America and the 
depressed Andean countries of 
Bolivia and Peru. In security terms, 
the Southern Cone countries are a 
long way from the U.S. m ainland -  
and there is no doubt that in the 
post-Cold War age, the signal of 
concern weakens the further it 
moves away from U.S. territory.
Only in Mexico, in fact, does the
U.S. recognize the need to respond 
with an integrated set of policies 
from trade and investment to immi­
gration and drugs.
In sum, LAC, as we have known it 
for 30 to 40 years, has been com pre­
hensively “deconstructed.” The new 
Americas is composed of different 
subregions, each with a different 
economic and security agenda and 
each with different relations with 
the U.S. The U.S. remains the hub 
of the new Americas, but it has not 
created and almost certainly does 
not need to create an even regional 
hegemony across all parts of the 
hem isphere. As for observers of the 
Americas, we have no choice but to 
follow the logic of the trends 
described here. This means that we 
must focus the best part of our 
future investigative and analytical 
efforts upon a proper disaggrega­
tion of the different parts of what 
we once thought of simply as “Latin 
America and the Caribbean.” ■
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Reports: Guatemala
And Justice For All?
Brad Bullock
C
entral American politics 
tend to generate a 
healthy skepticism about 
the significance of elec­
tions. Guatemala’s histo­
ry certainly inspires little 
optimism. Yet, these elections 
promised to be different from those 
of Guatemala’s past, and there were 
reasons for some excitement about 
their potential significance for 
Guatemala’s future. As it turned 
out, were they significant?
Speculation is dangerous business, 
and it may be too early to speculate 
about the eventual ramifications of 
the electoral results. But the event 
itself held hopeful signs that 
Guatemala is moving toward con­
structive change, and maybe even a 
lasting peace.
Guatemala is a country in urgent 
need of change and of peace. It is 
one the poorest nations in Latin 
America. Inequality is staggering -  
around 4 of every 5 Guatemalans live 
below the poverty line. At least 27 
percent of the population is landless, 
while around 2 percent of the 
landowners control 65 percent of the 
land. Although indigenous people 
comprise more than 60 percent of 
Guatemala’s 11 million citizens, their 
basic needs and rights have been 
ignored or denied for centuries; over 
1 million are internally displaced 
from their land and a half million 
more have fled to refugee camps 
across the Mexican border.
Guatemala’s social indicators are 
all near the bottom for Latin 
America: nearly half the population
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is illiterate; infant mortality stands at 
about 60 deaths per 1,000 live births 
(compared to about 9 for the U.S.); 
two-fifths of its people (mostly chil­
dren) suffer from malnutrition. It is 
at the top of the rankings, however, 
for hum an rights violations: in 1995, 
through July alone, there were over 
10,200 reported cases. Its people are 
now driven down by more than three 
decades of exceptional corruption, 
inefficiency, oppression, and bloody 
civil conflict (over 150,000 deaths 
and another 50,000 “disappeared,” 
mostly indigenous people at the 
hands of the military or paramilitary 
death squads). These realities, and 
fear, characterize Guatemalan life.
Powerful international 
forces are making new 
demands of the Guatemalan 
leadership while growing 
national forces are 
challenging the status 
quo from within.
Now change appears imminent. 
Powerful international forces are 
making new demands of the 
Guatemalan leadership while grow­
ing national forces are challenging 
the status quo from within. Stark 
realities and an atmosphere ripe for 
change -  within this context we may 
best understand the complexities of 
Guatemala’s 1995 elections and what 
made them unique.
P r e -e l e c t io n  C o n t e x t
One difference was the sense that 
there was finally a window through
which Guatemalans might expect 
fair and more representative elec­
tions. Peace negotiations with 
URNG insurgents made headway on 
im portant issues and produced 
promises for further agreements.
The Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional 
Guatemalteca (URNG) agreed to a 
cease-fire during the election period. 
The U.N. mission to verify the 
Guatemalan Hum an Rights Accords 
was in place, including a revision of 
the legal system and other measures 
enacted to challenge the traditional 
atmosphere of military impunity. 
Never before had so many interna­
tional observers been invited by the 
government to witness the elections.
Another difference was the greater 
num ber of groups invested in this 
event by comparison to past elec­
tions (in contrast, say, to those held 
in 1990). Guatemala is in an area of 
the world where elections are typical­
ly ignored by the North, but the 
international community expressed 
notable interest in these elections. 
Why so much interest and why, espe­
cially, U.S. interest? Preceding the 
elections, the causes of Rigoberta 
M enchu and Jennifer Harbury drew 
attention to Guatemala and pro­
duced international pressure on gov­
ernm ent officials to speed up the 
peace process. More representative 
elections and a peaceful transition of 
power, in this context, became a test 
of Guatemala’s commitment to 
peace.
Rigoberta Menchu, an indigenous 
Guatemalan and former exile, 
received a 1992 Nobel Peace Prize 
for her work publicizing the horrors 
of the civil war and the long struggle 
of her people to secure land and 
basic hum an rights. As an interna­
tional figure, M enchu monitored
10 Hemisphere • Volume Seven, Number Two
Reports: Guatemala
Electing change in Guatemala
pre-election events and drew atten­
tion to continuing acts of violence or 
intimidation that could compromise 
the integrity of the peace process or 
the elections. A good example is her 
public denouncem ent of the military 
slaying of 13 indigenous people in 
Copan. M enchu’s public statements 
about the alleged kidnapping of her 
nephew, just days before the elec­
tion, also brought considerable inter­
national attention and put the 
Guatemalan state on the defensive. 
The kidnaping turned out to be an 
extortion plot by her relatives.
As with Ms. M enchu’s public 
denouncements, the ongoing 
Harbury case has kept the world 
focused on extra-judicial acts of vio­
lence by the Guatemalan military.
On a grander scale, it has damaged 
the credibility of the U.S. role as 
global peace-maker and has made 
U.S. statements about pushing 
Guatemala’s “race for peace” sound 
ingenuous. The end of the Cold 
War and the lack of a credible “com­
munist threat” in the area has fos­
tered increasing intolerance for U.S. 
manipulations of regional politics.
New U.S. policy officially empha­
sizes defending hum an rights, resolv­
ing prolonged conflicts, and restor­
ing just, representative democracies 
in place of autocratic military 
regimes. The sincerity of these poli­
cies was bolstered by highly public 
U.S. operations in Haiti, but it was 
tarnished by the series of embarrass­
ing pre-election revelations tying the 
CIA to Guatemalan military officials 
involved in a num ber of killings or 
disappearances. For example,
Colonel Julio Alpirez was already an 
“asset” on the CIA payroll in 1990 
when he ordered the brutal slaying 
of U.S. citizen Michael Devine (just
months after Alpirez graduated from 
the U.S. School of the Americas in 
Ft. Benning, GA.). He is the same 
officer responsible for the extrajudi­
cial execution of H arbury’s husband, 
Efrain Bamaca, in 1992. Such inci­
dents doubtlessly influenced the 
replacement of ousted president 
Serrano, in 1993, with Ramiro de 
Leon Carpio, form er ombudsman of 
hum an rights.
Military acts of impunity have con­
tinued. Alpirez “escaped” the same 
night he was jailed and remains at 
large. Here again were revelations 
that jeopardized both the tenuous 
peace process and the elections, and 
for once the world was watching. 
Both governments were left with 
more reasons than ever to ensure 
the success of the elections, and 
although the U.S. issued official 
statements from a neutral position, it 
is likely that a stronger message to 
Guatemalan (and CIA) officials was 
delivered behind the scenes.
These elections included earnest 
participation by the left for the first 
time since the 1954 coup. A leftist 
coalition of parties called the New 
Guatemala Democratic Front 
(FDNG) wisely chose Jorge Gonzalez 
del Valle as its candidate for presi­
dent and Mayan leader Juan Leon 
Alvarado for vice president. Mr. 
Gonzalez carries impressive creden­
tials: economics studies at Yale and 
Columbia, form er president of the 
Bank of Guatemala, two stints as 
Latin American director of the IMF, 
and executive positions with several 
multinational financial institutions.
In a private meeting he explained 
that the FDNG provided voters with 
a viable alternative to conservative 
parties, an alternative that would 
include the interests of unions,
women, Mayan groups, and hum an 
rights organizations. As a new move­
ment, the FDNG focused on making 
inroads at the local and state levels. 
In many cases, they supported inde­
pendent civic committees running 
indigenous candidates for mayor 
rather than run their own candi­
dates.
Ironically, the political participa­
tion of the left was precipitated by 
the rise of the Guatemalan 
Republican Front (FRG), an extreme 
right-wing party led by Efrain Rios 
Montt. During his short reign from 
1982-83, Rios M ontt’s infamous 
“scorched earth” counterinsurgency 
policies left over 15,000 dead. A dis­
mal 17 percent of registered voters 
turned out for the special 1994 con­
gressional elections, due partly to a 
URNG boycott; the FRG won 32 out 
of 80 seats and Rios Montt was made 
president of the Congress. Rios 
M ontt’s announcem ent that he 
would run for president as the FRG 
candidate sent a wake-up call to the 
left. Although Rios Montt and then 
his wife were eventually ruled ineligi­
ble to run  for president, it was still 
Rios M ontt’s party. FRG campaign 
posters showed Rios Montt in the 
center, between candidates Alfonso 
Portillo and Carlos Anibal Mendez, 
his arms around their shoulders. In 
fact, the party’s own slogan was, 
“Portillo to the presidency, Rios 
Montt to power.”
Indigenous groups were also 
invested in these elections. One rea­
son was the participation of the 
FDNG. The URNG broke precedent 
and did not call on citizens to boy­
cott the elections. Another factor 
was the newly established Rigoberta 
M enchu Foundation, an agency for 
advancing the causes of indigenous
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Guatemalans. The F oundation’s 
first m ajor project was to mobilize 
the indigenous vote; it d irected 
campaigns to register indigenous 
people in rural areas and spon­
sored local workshops to educate 
largely illiterate campesinos about 
the electoral process.
Pam phlets and posters were dis­
tribu ted  in Mayan dialects ra ther 
than Spanish, and M enchu made 
several public appearances endors­
ing the 1995 elections as a tool for 
voicing indigenous issues. Careful 
to rem ain nonpartisan, she spoke 
at a final rally m arking the official 
close of the cam paign period; the 
speech encouraged her people to 
overcome their apathy or fears and 
vote for whom would best rep re­
sent them . And, for once, there 
were some indigenous candidates 
on the ballot. Indigenous citizens 
exercised their righ t to form  inde­
p en d en t civic com m ittees and ran 
their own candidates at the local 
mayoral level, m arking a new 
epoch in G uatem alan elections.
G uatem ala’s traditional power 
base did not p resent a unified 
front. T he m ilitary and the eco­
nom ic elite dem onstrated  divided 
loyalties that contribu ted  to some 
uneasy alliances. Those focused 
on preserving the national status 
quo leaned toward parties on the 
far right, such as Rios M ontt’s 
FRG. This included m ilitary hard­
liners, who found no reason to 
accom m odate the URNG, and the 
CACIF, a powerful group rep re­
senting the private sector. Military 
institutionalistas, m ore open  to 
negotiated  peace and a revised 
role for the army, and a rising 
group o f in ternational financiers 
supported  parties no t so far to the 
right, particularly the new Party of 
N ational Advancem ent (PAN). 
R epresenting the “m odernizing 
righ t,” the PAN’s presidential can­
didate, Alvaro Arzu, rode this sup­
port to a lead in the pre-election 
polls.
In the end, there were 19 presi­
dential candidates representing 23 
parties. Yet amid signs that new 
forces were shaping an event akin to 
real democratic elections, 
Guatemala’s electoral process still 
serves to protect the power of the 
Ladino minority through what may 
be called structural fraud. Balloting 
is done by hand from com puter­
generated sheets containing the 
names of everyone who has voted in 
the last several elections. Only the 
final stages of vote counting are 
done electronically. Many of the 
dead and missing have not been 
purged from the rolls, yet this does 
not always stop them  from casting 
votes, as Guatemalans will wryly tell 
you.
Many of the dead and 
missing have not been 
purged from the rolls, 
yet this does not always 
stop them from casting 
votes, as Guatemalans 
will wryly tell you.
New registrants and all voters 
must present a cedula, or national 
identity card, and replacing a cedula 
requires birth docum ents and some 
courage. Over decades of civil war, 
hundreds of rural villages were 
utterly destroyed and hundreds of 
thousands of indigenous people 
were internally-displaced or became 
refugees; cedulas and o ther records 
have been burned, confiscated, or 
lost in flight. Children born  in 
flight or in hiding are now coming 
of age to register but have no offi­
cial papers.
Voters are also required to return 
to their birthplace, or where their 
cedula was issued, to cast their bal­
lots. The time and expense to trav­
el, sometimes great distances, and 
the lost hours of work are the hard­
est on the rural, and largely indige­
nous, poor. Finally, due to com­
plaints about m anipulations and 
“anom alies” in the 1991 decennial 
census, political representation is 
still based on the census from 1981. 
Given the high birth rates in indige­
nous districts, one can understand 
why a Ladino governm ent might 
favor such a method.
O ther types of structural fraud 
seem more endemic to these partic­
ular elections. The ballots were 8.5 
inch by 11 inch sheets covered with 
colorful party symbols. Since virtu­
ally every local, state, and national 
position in the country was up for 
grabs, a typically illiterate voter 
received five separate color-coded 
ballots that had to be properly 
marked, folded, and re tu rned  to 
corresponding table slots. The pres­
idential ballot alone presented 10 
symbols, coincidentally arranged so 
that those of the PAN and the FRG
-  the two leading parties -  held the 
prom inent positions on the page. 
The process was confusing and 
lengthy, and thus potentially dis­
couraging. After waiting in line, 
voters averaged between four and 
five minutes to mark and stuff the 
ballots. This raises another issue: 
each voting table was assigned 600 
potential voters who had to vote at 
that table during the 12 hours polls 
were open. Even if voters averaged 
only two minutes to complete the 
entire process, only 360 voters per 
table would make it through. The 
TSE responded to this observation 
by declaring that anyone still wait­
ing in line when the polls closed 
would be allowed to vote, but it was 
not always the case.
E l e c t i o n  R e s u l t s
As commonly predicted, no presi­
dential candidate won a majority, 
resulting in a January 7, 1996 ru n ­
off between the PAN and the FRG. 
The PAN’s Arzu was declared the
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victor with just over 51 percent of 
the vote. PAN took 42 out of 80 
congressional seats in the November 
elections and now enjoys a solid 
majority position from which to 
push its neoliberal economic agen­
da. The FRG won the second 
largest num ber of seats in congress, 
making it the largest minority party. 
Most notable, however, was the 
respectable showing by the leftist 
FDNG coalition, which was predict­
ed to get less than 2 percent of the 
vote; instead, it won almost 8 per­
cent of the vote and 6 congressional 
seats, giving marginalized groups a 
new voice in the national power 
structure. The FDNG also collected 
four mayoral victories. These victo­
ries, though nominally small, heart­
en an incipient grass-roots move­
m ent for change.
People finally want to know 
whether the elections were fair. I 
believe that generally they were, 
given the limits of the electoral 
process. From my observations, 
there was little to suggest that the 
local people were engaged in any­
thing but an earnest attem pt to 
carry out their duties with integrity. 
With few exceptions, infractions 
were minor. The table volunteers, 
many of whom worked from about 6 
a.m. until 11 p.m., received 50Q 
each (about $8) from the TSE for 
their efforts. The military basically 
stayed away and there was no seri­
ous election day violence. The pres­
ence of international teams helped 
remove blatant forms of fraud at 
lower levels. Certainly, there were 
denouncem ents for fraud and 
intimidation at particular polling 
places -  disturbances included 
threats of force and reports of bal­
lot-stuffing or ballot-burning -  but 
such incidents were fewer than in 
past elections.
Fraud at a higher level cannot be 
ruled out. Despite assurances from 
the TSE about the results, in terna­
tionals and representatives from the 
several parties continue to express
grave misgivings about the 45- 
minute, nationwide power outage 
that in terrupted  the vote tally (the 
official explanation was that a tree 
had fallen on a power line!). For 
another unsettling bit of news, the 
governm ent actually printed a total 
on 39 million ballots, more than 
twice the am ount required even if 
all 3.6 million registered voters 
showed up to vote. We never did 
get a good explanation for why so 
many extra ballots were printed nor 
learn what happened to them. Yet, 
the most disturbing aspect of the 
elections remains the structural 
problems built into the electoral 
process itself. These problems help 
to explain a lighter rural tu rnout 
for the presidential run-off, 
although nobody expected indige­
nous citizens to be highly motivated 
to for either candidate.
T h e  F in a l  A n a l y s is
The event became a symbolic 
turning point for Guatemala -  a 
harbinger of better things. Elections 
will have m attered a great deal. 
However, in a volatile new world 
order, reforms depend more than 
ever on external forces that appear 
beyond the control of the govern­
m ent or the people. Even if Arzu’s 
neoliberal policies or the promise of
an extension of NAFTA agreements 
improve economic growth, this 
alone may only aggravate economic 
disparities. Selling off public en ter­
prises, creating free trade zones, 
and m ore maquilas will not address 
hum an rights violations or landless­
ness.
At least the PAN’s narrow presi­
dential victory makes progressive 
reforms more likely. Hum an rights 
activists were mortified by Portillo’s 
announcem ent that upon his victo­
ry, Rios Montt would be appointed 
head of the new National Security 
Commission (giving him more 
power than the defense m inister). 
Had the FRG won the election and 
effectively restored Rios M ontt to 
power, it would have represented a 
giant step backward for Guatemala. 
At best, the result would have m eant 
business as usual.
As the new president, Arzu’s effec­
tiveness will be challenged by high 
crime and unem ploym ent rates, 
chronic poverty, and continuing 
concerns over hum an rights viola­
tions. He must still work with an 
entrenched oligarchy. But his 
biggest challenges will be complet­
ing the peace negotiations and 
revising the role of the military -  
still one of the most powerful forces 
in Guatemala. ■
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The Economics of Security
Patrice M. Franho
L
atin America has under­
gone three profound 
changes in its security 
environm ent in the late 
1980s and the first half 
of the 1990s. The end 
of the Cold War has transform ed 
the international security arena, 
realigning actors and objectives. At 
the same time, most Latin American 
nations were undertaking the diffi­
cult process of democratization, fun­
damentally altering the relationship 
between civilians and the military in 
the public arena. Finally, the pur­
suit of political opening was accom­
panied by economic liberalization. 
Given the long experience with 
im port substitution industrializa­
tion, the move toward a market-dri­
ven developm ent strategy is a revo­
lution in the economic paradigm 
for the region.
A n  O v e r v ie w
Neoliberalism effectively ended 
import-substitution industrialization 
(ISI) strategies that dom inated the 
economic landscape in the region 
from the 1950s through the 1980s.
In contrast to the state-centered 
inward looking policies of ISI, 
neoliberalism places the interna­
tional m arket at the center of the 
developm ent process. The neoliber­
al model, dubbed the Washington 
Consensus to reflect the positions of 
the IMF, the World Bank and the 
U.S. government, encourages price 
liberalization, deregulation of mar­
kets, virtual free trade, unrestricted 
capital movements, private sector
Patrice M. Franko is associate professor 
of economics and international studies 
at Colby College in Maine
activity and the use of m onetary pol­
icy instruments. This is a radical 
change from the arguments as to 
international price instability, the 
need for state incentives for growth, 
the focus on technology acquisition 
by the state to com plem ent markets, 
and the use of fiscal policy to pro­
mote growth in the ISI package. 
What implications does neoliberal­
ism have for security policy in the 
region?
Cutting defense expenditures 
along with other items in 
the budget is not necessarily 
a bad thing. The decline in 
defense spending in the 
region, however, has largely 
taken place in a policy 
vacuum.
T h e  N e o l jb e r a l  M o d e l
A core assumption of neoliberal­
ism is the proposition that the pri­
vate m arket perform s better than 
the state in the allocation of 
resources. Its im plem entation is 
first and forem ost about limiting 
the economic choices a state makes 
in the developm ent process. It is 
no accident that the rise of neolib­
eralism coincided with the end of 
access to easy money. Even without 
the strict conditions of the 
International M onetary Fund and 
the World Bank, tight resources 
forced nations to make tough 
choices between com peting ends. 
The neoliberal m odel replaces 
active axe chopping on the part of
the governm ent with the passive 
workings of the market.
Defense, nevertheless, is no t mar­
ket driven. The quintessential pub­
lic good, the responsibility for secu­
rity decision making falls on the 
shoulders of governm ent -  a gov­
ernm ent increasingly constrained in 
its ability to pursue a wide range of 
options. With fewer resources, the 
opportunity costs of making one 
choice versus the o ther increase. As 
a result, governments have cut back 
on spending in the defense sector. 
Figure 1 shows the simultaneous 
decline in military spending (Milex) 
and central governm ent expendi­
ture (CGE) in the region. (Note 
the different scales for each as rep­
resented by two vertical axes.) In 
1983, central governm ent expendi­
tures in Latin America were $335.8 
billion; military expenditures were 
$22.9 billion, approximately 6.8 per­
cent of every governm ent dollar 
spent. After a decade of structural 
adjustment, in 1993 central govern­
m ent expenditures fell to $282.4 bil­
lion and military expenditures regis­
tered $17.4 billion or 6.2 percent of 
governm ent spending. In South 
America the real growth rate of mili­
tary expenditures was -2.1 percent 
over the decade; in Central America 
-19.6 percent. In sharp contrast, 
military spending in the developing 
world as a whole declined -0.7 per­
cent. The decline of the armed 
forces in South America reflected 
these cuts in expenditures, decreas­
ing -3.2 percent over the period; in 
Central America the decrease was 
2.7 percent. The U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency reported 
that the average annual force ratio, 
or the num bers in the arm ed forces 
com pared to the population fell 5
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Figure 1: Trends in Central Government Expenditure and Military Spending
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Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures 1983-1993
percent in South America and 4.7 
percent in Central America.
Cutting defense expenditures 
along with o ther items in the bud­
get is no t necessarily a bad thing. 
The decline in defense spending in 
the region, however, has largely 
taken place in a policy vacuum. As 
cogently argued by Francisco Rojas 
Aravena in “Procesos de Decisiones en el 
Gasto Militar Latinoamericano ” 
(Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad, Aho 9, 
Vol. IX, No. 3, Julio-Septiembre
1994), defense policy in Latin 
America has no t responded to the 
changes in the internal or external 
environments. Appropriations for 
defense are undertaken on an his­
torical basis, minus cuts by necessity. 
The overall shape of government 
has changed, but the execution of 
defense policy has not been radical­
ly altered. Neoliberalism as accom­
panied by democratization requires 
a fresh vision of defense spending 
in the region. Rather than policy by
default, scarce resources should be 
deployed to m eet clearly defined 
objectives that reflect the new inter­
national and domestic realities.
A rearticulation of defense policy 
in the new strategic environm ent 
must responsibly ask the question 
whether additions to defense spend­
ing exceed the costs. As every eco­
nomics principles student knows, 
efficiency in a m arket is achieved 
where the marginal benefits of an 
action equal the marginal costs. If 
the additional costs of a particular 
objective exceed the addition to 
benefits per dollar spent, the activity 
should not be undertaken.
This hard nosed equation is dri­
ven by the assumption that one can 
accurately measure both costs and 
benefits. Consider the option of 
participating in multilateral peace­
keeping operations. The addition 
to cost is easily estimated, and if 
international agencies cover some 
portion of the participants’ salary
and benefits, the direct costs may 
indeed appear to be minimal. 
Indirect costs should also be includ­
ed; if the military is engaged in mul­
tilateral activities, it is not doing 
something else. For some, ironical­
ly, this is a benefit, arguing that if 
the military is engaged in Bosnia or 
Haiti, it is not meddling in politics 
at home. For others, soldiers sent 
abroad to keep the peace in anoth­
er nation are resources not applied 
within domestic borders.
Benefits are even harder to esti­
mate. Participation in peacekeep­
ing operations brings with it train­
ing, especially in terms of interoper­
ability with o ther forces. It is 
argued that a degree of profession­
alization occurs as Latin militaries 
work side by side with NATO sol­
diers. Participation in peacekeep­
ing may also bring prestige and 
favor in the international com m uni­
ty-
At the risk of traumatizing those 
who hated principles of microeco­
nomics, it is useful to think of this 
discussion in graphic terms.
Assume that we can group levels of 
participation in peacekeeping oper­
ations starting from a minimal level, 
A, over increasing amounts, ending 
in option F. We note that the bene­
fits of peacekeeping, like any other 
good facing diminishing returns, 
tend to decrease as we engage in 
m ore o f it. Arbitrary num bers have 
been assigned to the vertical axes, 
showing that initially peacekeeping 
brings benefits in terms of prestige 
and training, but as more peace­
keeping is undertaken there are 
fewer additional benefits. Armed 
forces have been trained, the inter­
national community has sent its 
thanks, and the benefits diminish.
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Figure 2: Relative Costs and Benefits of Peacekeeping Operations
Marginal Benefits Marginal Costs
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Costs increase with increasing levels 
of engagement. At level E, for 
example, we see that the costs of 
peacekeeping far exceed the bene­
fits. Activity should be cut back to 
the level where the addition to ben­
efits just equals the cost.
As difficult as these costs and ben­
efits are to estimate, it is imperative 
to do so. Decreases in resources 
available to the military require 
hard choices in defense policy. In a 
democratic society this debate 
should take place as an annual, 
transparent part of defense appro­
priations.
One of the key difficulties in 
applying marginal analysis is the 
problem  of time. Marginal costs 
and benefits accrue not only in the 
present but also in the future. If 
resources are directed toward 
hum anitarian assistance, the cost 
may come out of programs in m od­
ernization. Investments postponed 
in technological development may 
multiply over time. Comparing 
defense and nondefense spending, 
many of the objectives of the neolib­
eral model have been of a short­
term  nature. Central government 
expenditures are cut to m eet fiscal 
targets today. National security is
about investments for the future. 
The costs of neglecting a coherent 
long-term defense strategy may esca­
late in the long run.
Despite the difficulties of account­
ing for time or of exactly measuring 
the benefits and the costs, such 
exercises are the basis for sound 
policy planning. It is easy to say 
that peacekeeping or regional 
defense activity is good; the harder 
question is to estimate just how 
m uch it will add to a nation’s securi­
ty over time and at what level multi­
lateral programs will detract from 
other missions. The scarce 
resources available to governments 
under neoliberalism makes efficien­
cy m atter more.
S o c ia l  C o s t s  o f  S t a b il iz a t io n
U nder neoliberalism, all central 
governm ent expenditures are scaled 
back. The process of structural 
adjustm ent involves a painful 
retrenchm ent of social spending. 
Programs designed to address 
poverty, social safety nets and 
employment suffer. Local and 
national governments, pared down 
in the nam e of cost-cutting and effi­
ciency, find it hard to m eet the 
needs of the poor. The World Bank
estimates that Latin America will 
have to invest $60 billion annually 
just to catch up with existing 
dem ands for water, transportation, 
electricity, sewage, ports and 
telecommunications. Investments 
in the social sectors are even more 
overwhelming.
As the state is less equipped to 
tackle these social and infrastruc­
ture deficits, there is an increased 
likelihood of violence. The uprising 
in Chiapas, Mexico and the anarchy 
in favelas in Brazil are indicators of 
the degree of social decay and the 
failure to m eet these m ounting 
problems with peaceful means. The 
rising rate of violent crimes in the 
region has pushed governments, 
including Brazil, the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Venezuela, to call their armies into 
the street. In the Dominican 
Republic the army was called in to 
end three days of rioting ignited by 
a bus fare increase. The Bolivian 
army was called out to stop a teach­
ers march in La Paz. It is not coin­
cidental that when the Venezuelan 
government authorized increases on 
the order of 40 percent for 44 basic 
food items at the end of February
1995, the defense minister present­
ed President Caldera with a plan for 
containing violence in the capital.
People are tired of waiting for the 
gains from economic adjustment. 
They want a decent standard of liv­
ing with increasing opportunity for 
their children -  not further sacri­
fice. The region’s bishops blamed 
neoliberalism for the problems of 
extrem e poverty at a conference in 
Mexico on May 7, 1995. Said 
Venezuela’s Roberto Luckert, “ The 
cruel neoliberalism [has created] a 
barrel of gunpowder which could 
go off any time [by installing] the 
dictatorship of the m arket and mak­
ing the dollar its God.”
Not only has spending on social 
services suffered in the painful 
adjustm ent dem anded by neoliber­
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alism, but the ability to respond to 
crises has also been weakened. As 
local governments attem pt to 
address a multiplicity of demands 
with limited resources, spending on 
law enforcem ent is cut along with 
social services. Local police forces 
are unable to react to maintain 
internal peace. Given the limited 
capacity of law enforcement, the 
military is increasingly being called 
upon to maintain internal order. 
The experience of Guatemala, 
Brazil, Mexico and Peru are clear 
examples of the failure of civilian 
law enforcem ent to m eet the rising 
tide of violence.
This puts militaries in a policy 
bind. On the one hand, militaries 
d o n ’t perceive their primary func­
tion as keeping the internal peace. 
One doesn’t jo in  the military to 
fight gang wars in slums. Yet civilian 
authorities, unable to contain crises, 
have ordered the military to keep 
the internal peace. Until resources 
are available for enhanced law 
enforcement, it is likely that mili­
taries will continue to be called 
upon to execute police functions. 
Well organized and disciplined, mil­
itaries perform  well. This has led to 
an improved public profile of the 
military as an institution. Public 
opinion apparently has a short 
mem ory for costs of military govern­
ment. When confronted with social 
chaos, the public is increasingly 
clamoring for the military to step in 
to maintain internal peace. Clearly, 
this has a cost in terms of the con­
solidation of democracy. Neverthe­
less, without a strengthening of the 
capacity of the state to both attend 
to poverty and the conflict that is 
created by social problems, one 
should not be surprised by more 
tanks in the favelas.
P r e v e n t iv e  P o l ic ie s
Militaries, ever the defensive plan­
ners, are looking to dissipate the 
internal threats to stability. Rather 
than combat its citizens, the military
is working to eradicate the condi­
tions leading to conflict and insta­
bility. H um anitarian and nation 
building activities have increased in 
Latin America, as the arm ed forces 
are employed in preventing the 
sources of violence.
People are tired of waiting 
for the gains from economic 
adjustment. They want a 
decent standard of living 
with increasing opportunity 
for their children -  not 
further sacrifice.
A study by the Centro para la Paz y 
la Reconciliation showed defense 
spending accelerating in Central 
America, a trend accepted by a fear­
ful public faced with the fact that 
m ore than 60 percent of the 
region’s 30 million inhabitants are 
living below the poverty line. Once 
again, as in reacting to violence, the 
engagem ent of the military in the 
provision of social services is no t the 
best policy choice. Construction 
workers, not colonels, should be 
building roads. Teachers, not sol­
diers, should be prom oting literacy. 
Green brigades, not green berets, 
should be working to improve envi­
ronm ental conditions. But as the 
capacity of the state to m eet the 
social needs has been emasculated, 
the military is increasingly moving 
to provide emergency services that 
are not being funded in civilian pro­
grams.
Class distinctions may also play 
into the internal security vacuum. 
Wealthy neighborhoods in Latin 
America have addressed the prob­
lem of increasing social tension by 
moving to the m arket to purchase 
security. Clovis Brigagao, of the 
Centro de Estudios Brasil-Estados
Unidos, Universidad Candido Mendes 
in Rio de Janeiro, has inform ed me 
that private security forces guard 
the entrances to upscale neighbor­
hoods, and every building from the 
middle class up has a doorm an that 
doubles as an inspector. As in the 
U nited States, malls with private 
security agents have replaced city 
centers as safe shopping meccas. As 
the wealthy abdicate public spaces 
for the haven of private protection, 
this underm ines the ability of 
municipalities to finance local and 
state police forces. Already 
stretched to maintain law and order, 
civilian governments in Brazil, 
Bolivia, and Guatemala find the mil­
itary the only option to keep the 
internal peace.
P r iv a t iz a t io n  o f  D e f e n s e
The drive toward privatization of 
public enterprises in neoliberalism 
has not missed the defense indus­
tries in the region. EMBRAER, the 
Brazilian state aeronautical firm, has 
been privatized, with the Ministry of 
Aeronautics retaining a controlling 
share for reasons of national securi­
ty. FAMAE, which claims to be the 
oldest m unitions firm in the region, 
has moved from state ownership to 
state m anagem ent of the defense 
acquisition process. Argentina has 
em barked on a wholesale privatiza­
tion of its defense sector.
Privatization of military produc­
tion has its advantages. EMBRAER 
is better able to raise capital in 
international markets, will be freed 
from restrictive labor laws, and will 
have m ore flexibility in product 
development than it did with a 
stronger partnership with the 
Brazilian Air Force. FAMAE is bet­
ter positioned to m eet the needs of 
the Chilean arm ed forces by pur­
chasing essentially in the private 
m arket and taking advantage of an 
open bidding process to procure at 
the lowest possible cost. By subcon­
tracting through competitive bids, 
the firm doubled sales in 1994. The
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needs of the Chilean military are 
better met through efficient use of 
m odernization resources. In 
Argentina the privatization of 
defense firms has added to the cred­
ibility of its international liberaliza­
tion package.
But privatization of defense pro­
duction may have political and tech­
nological costs. Private firms are 
less accountable to foreign policy 
objectives. A comparison of the his­
torical activity of EMBRAER with 
that of ENGESA, the private tank 
producer in Brazil, is telling. State- 
owned EMBRAER’s customer list -  
which includes the United States, 
European and other Latin nations -  
was significantly different from the 
clients of ENGESA, which included 
Libya, Iraq and Angola. The activi­
ties of Hugo Piva and his Brazilian 
engineering firm HOP in Iraq 
caused considerable diplomatic ten­
sion during the Gulf War, signifi­
cantly damaging U.S.-Brazilian rela­
tions. The possible sales of arma­
ments from Argentina and from 
Chile to supply Ecuador in its con­
flict with Peru point to the difficul­
ties of control under free markets.
The privatization of defense pro­
duction in the region must be 
accom panied by strong and coher­
en t control of exports. This, how­
ever, brings with it internal political 
costs. Tides of nationalism swell 
when munitions control laws are 
exported seemingly wholesale from 
the U.S. State Departm ent. The dif­
ficulty in passing such a bill in Brazil 
is instructive. Hom e grown, subre­
gional export control regimes may 
prove more promising, should the 
political will exist.
Internationalization has, by neces­
sity, accompanied the privatization 
of defense in the region. Not only 
in Latin America, but throughout 
the industrializing world as well, 
going it alone in the defense arena 
is not financially viable. Jo in t ven­
tures and co-production agreements 
are the vehicles to capture
economies of scale in defense pro­
duction. EMBRAER has long had 
international partners; ENAER and 
ASMAR in Chile have collaborated 
with the Israelis, am ong others. 
Internationalization of defense pro­
duction is no t new, but the pace is 
accelerating.
The privatization of defense 
production in the region 
must be accompanied by 
strong and coherent control 
of exports.
While jo in t ventures are, in a 
sense, the only game in town, their 
costs should be acknowledged.
The historical rationale for defense 
production in the region has 
included a desire for autonom ous 
procurem ent and developm ent of 
indigenous technological capabili­
ties. While the weight placed on 
technological developm ent was cer­
tainly stronger in Brazil and 
A rgentina than in Chile, the im pe­
tus to prom ote national capabilities 
in high technology items through 
the locomotive of defense was pre­
sent. U nder im port substitution, 
especially in Brazil and Argentina, 
state-centered technological devel­
opm ent was to break the bottle­
necks to industrial change. 
Technological acquisition in the 
neoliberal m odel is centered in the 
in ternational private market. The 
prim ary actor, ra ther than state 
centers o f research and develop­
m ent, is the m ultinational defense 
firm. W hether this, on balance, 
brings benefits or costs over the 
long ru n  remains to be seen. At 
the very least, one must m onitor 
the technological gains and losses 
in the defense arena if the national 
security goals of autonom y are 
retained.
T h e  I n t e r n a t io n a l  M a r k e t
A critical part of neoliberalism is a 
successful export drive. Exports 
generate hard currency which can 
be reinvested for growth or used to 
reduce external liabilities. O ne of 
the shortcomings of import-substitu- 
tion industrialization was its neglect 
of exports as an engine for growth. 
But over-exporting also has its costs. 
The race to export has pressured 
the resource capacity of nations to 
sustain the external orientation.
This problem  of resource conflicts 
has been alarmingly evident in the 
fishing skirmishes. Countries such 
as Argentina, Canada, Peru, Chile 
and Brazil want control over coastal 
fishing beyond their exclusive eco­
nomic zones (EEZs) guaranteed in 
the Law of the Sea Treaty. They 
argue that it is imperative to police 
beyond the 200-mile limit as stocks 
are being depleted by hundreds of 
fishing vessels from Spain, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Russia -  and the 
fish d o n ’t neatly confine themselves 
to the arbitrated limit. Defending 
coastal resources has led to interna­
tional incidents. This becomes less 
surprising when international mar­
ket earnings from exports of 
seafood have overtaken traditional 
export fare such as beef in 
Argentina. Economic resource con­
flicts become an issue of military 
security when diplomacy fails to 
resolve com peting claims.
O ther resource-driven conflicts 
have arisen in areas where borders 
are not clearly defined or defensi­
ble. The confrontations on the 
Brazilian-Venezuelan border, for 
example, are driven by the property 
rights of the garampeiros in search of 
gold. Migration problems are 
caused by the lack of opportunity in 
both the rural and urban sectors. 
The same conflicts may have taken 
place under the old development 
model. Today, however, economic 
actors are more vulnerable to the 
vagaries of the m arket without the 
strong safety net of the state.
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The focus on competition in the 
international marketplace has raised 
the stakes in the international 
growth game. Ironically, the com­
petitiveness of the neoliberal market 
creates externalities that can only be 
solved by cooperation. As countries 
are linked by invisible m arket flows, 
they are at once fierce rivals and 
mutually dependent, particularly in 
addressing the problems the market 
creates. Permeable borders 
increase the flow of contraband and 
people. There is sentim ent in Brazil 
that opening up coastal and inland 
navigation to foreign companies 
endangers national sovereignty. 
Narcotrafficking has found interna­
tionalization to its advantage. 
Competition in markets has led to 
the need for cooperation in security 
and environmental policies to 
address the conflicts created by the 
drive toward global production. In 
contrast to the use of force by the 
state to defend m ercantile interests 
in the precapitalist era, globalized 
m arket structures will dem and new 
forms of military cooperation to 
enhance security.
N e w  P a t t e r n s  
Douglas MacArthur said, “There 
is no security on this earth; there is 
only opportunity.” W hat are the 
opportunities we need to consider 
to improve security both within and 
between nations given the chal­
lenges of the neoliberal model?
• Map Defense Resources into a 
Policy Framework: To address the 
inconsistencies in defense inputs 
and outputs, security spending must 
be m apped into a policy framework. 
National and regional security 
objectives must be redefined and 
appropriations made to reflect the 
changed security environment.
While this sounds so obvious, it is 
not a simple task. Nationally, vested 
interests of various parts of the 
arm ed forces may be at stake. It will 
be difficult to ask, on a line-by-line
basis, w hether the additional dollar 
spent in one program  exceeds its 
potential benefits in another.
• Civic and Humanitarian Action: 
Reversing the Permanent 
Emergency: Given the increase in 
social tensions and the limited 
resources of the state to address 
them, the military will be asked to 
perform  internal policing func­
tions. For many militaries in the 
region, this has long been defined 
as com plem entary to their mission 
of guaranteeing national security. 
Ideally, police forces and social ser­
vices are the front line in ensuring 
internal peace. W hen this fails, 
however, the military objective is to 
contain the emergency. O ne o f the 
im portant policy tasks is to plan for 
the disengagem ent of the military 
after the crisis is over. H anding off 
hum anitarian action to civilian 
agencies is as im portant as respond­
ing to the initial stages of a crisis. 
Given that in the m edium -term  the 
military is going to continue to be 
an asset in the hands of civilian gov­
ernm ents trying to make do with 
less, planning for the mechanisms 
of coordination between military 
and civilian agencies should 
enhance the effectiveness o f public 
policy.
• Consolidating Institutional 
Reform in the Security Arena:
Reorienting the defense policy 
debate to reflect new political and 
economic realities will require the 
developm ent of new institutional 
flexibility. In his essay “Latin 
America’s Journey to the M arket” 
(Journal of Democracy, Fall 1994), 
Moises Naim suggests that stage 
one of the marketization process 
involved changing the set of eco­
nomic rules; stage two, he con­
tends, is the hard  work of consoli­
dating institutions. This must 
include military institutions or the 
military will become a dinosaur in 
the new dem ocratic arena.
• Extend Regional Security 
Cooperation: The challenges of the 
market for the region dem and 
greater cooperation in the hemi­
sphere. Economies of scale can be 
captured in purchasing compatible 
systems. Inter-operability is one 
gain; another can be found in 
regional service and m aintenance 
depots. Working together to attract 
high technology industries improves 
regional bargaining power, rather 
than ceding the control to divide 
and conquer to the multinational 
firms. An inventory of terms and 
conditions of multinational partner­
ships in the production of defense- 
related materials m ight enhance 
bargaining power in technology 
transfer agreements. Regional 
annual meetings of procurem ent 
staffs for branches of the services 
would not only enhance transparen­
cy but also identify areas for cooper­
ative buying arrangements. While 
cooperation in defense procure­
m ent and production m ight seem to 
run  against the historical tide of 
secret arms races for superiority, it is 
likely that the security threats facing 
Latin America in the coming 
decades will dem and not defense 
against neighboring armies, but 
cooperatively combating forces 
beyond one nation’s control.
A P r a g m a t i c  N e o l i b e r a l i s m
The purpose of this essay was not 
to argue that neoliberalism be 
thrown out, but rather that policy 
be directed at the challenges this 
new paradigm presents. This essay 
is a call for pragmatism -  an 
acknowledgment that all develop­
m ent strategies have their costs and 
benefits. The challenges that the 
neoliberal m odel has raised for the 
security environm ent m erit both 
short- and long-term policy adjust­
ments. Addressing the complicated 
relationships in the economic and 
security marketplace can serve to 
enhance the perform ance of 
both. ■
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Insider briefs on people and institutions 
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
Kidnapping Business
Kidnapping in Ladn America has 
reached epidemic proportions.
The February 1996 edition of 
U.S./Latin Trade notes that kidnap­
ping of foreign and national execu­
tives is a growing business. Weak 
and often corrupt law enforcem ent 
and wealth disparity account for the 
increase. Paradoxically, economic 
growth in the region has increased 
the opportunities for kidnappers as 
more business executives have 
arrived in each country. Gone are 
the days when guerrillas kidnapped 
people in the name of some ideolo­
gy; today, kidnapping is conducted 
as an income redistribution mecha­
nism. In this new scenario, govern­
ments are discovering that offering 
guerrillas amnesty and integration 
into political life is not an attractive 
offer when millions can be made 
through kidnapping and extortion.
MRTA Expands
Intelligence reports have long 
reported  that the Movimiento 
Revolucionario Tupac Amaru 
(MRTA), the Peruvian guerrilla 
group claimed to have been dis­
m antled by President Fujimori, has 
expanded its operations into 
Bolivia. In December 1995, MRTA 
members were arrested in La Paz 
and Montevideo accused of kidnap­
ping Samuel Doria Medina, a 
wealthy industrialist and form er 
minister of planning. Following 
nearly 60 days in captivity, Doria 
Medina was released after paying a 
hefty ransom. The MRTA has appar-
Edited by Eduardo A. Gamarra 
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ently recruited well in Bolivia; high 
ranking members of the Central 
Obrera Boliviana, were also arrested 
in connection with the kidnapping.
Paz Zamora’s Visa Pulled
In January 1996, the U.S. embassy 
in La Paz, Bolivia announced that it 
was revoking form er president 
Jaime Paz Zam ora’s visa. Form er 
party chief Oscar Eid Franco and 
Paz Zam ora’s sister Edith, two of 
the form er president’s closest allies, 
also had their visas canceled. Since 
early 1994, accusations that Paz 
Zamora and his party, the 
Movimiento de Izquierda 
Revolucionaria had close connec­
tions with narcotics traffickers have 
led to the im prisonm ent of Eid 
Franco and a complete crisis in the 
MIR. Paz Zamora has already 
announced that he will run  for 
office in 1997 despite U.S. actions.
Walmart in Brazil
In the January 21 edition of El 
Nuevo Herald, Katherine Ellison 
reported  that a real “Walmart 
Revolution” has occurred in Brazil. 
Walmart recently opened two so- 
called Supercenters in the outskirts 
of Brazil; over 10,000 clients 
m obbed the store when it opened 
and supervisors were forced to shut 
the doors three times to prevent an 
avalanche. On the second day, the 
store shut down two hours early 
after selling out its inventory. But 
not everyone is pleased with 
W almart’s success. The president of 
Nestle accused the Arkansas- based 
company of dum ping practices to 
keep prices artificially low. As 
occurred in the United States, the
most affected are small retailers 
who cannot com pete with the low 
prices offered by megastores.
Crime and Punishment
The H onduran military is feeling a 
bit ambivalent these days. General 
Luis Alonso Discua, com m ander of 
the arm ed forces and alleged to 
have been involved in serious 
hum an rights violations in the 
1980s, was nam ed alternate ambas­
sador to the United Nations. This 
post is significant because 
H onduras currently holds a seat on 
the Security Council. At the same 
time, however, the H onduran 
Supreme Court ru led  that 10 mili­
tary officers could be prosecuted 
for the disappearance of six stu­
dents in 1982. It is still unlikely that 
any officer will ever face trial.
Palito Goes to College
Palito Ortega, the form er governor 
of Tucuman, Argentina has always 
sought ways to improve himself. He 
grew up as a street child and went 
on to become revered by millions of 
Latin Americans for his romantic 
songs and movies. Ortega is now 
getting ready to face the most seri­
ous challenge of his life; he is 
preparing to run  for the presidency 
in the year 2000. In January, his 
staff told Hemisphere that as part of a 
strategy to become president, he 
intends to pursue a degree in 
International Relations at Florida 
International University.
Investment Declines
According to the foreign investment 
superin tendency of Venezuela, for-
F I L E
eign investment in Venezuela 
declined by 43 percent between 
January and November 1995 in 
comparison to the same period in
1994. Investment capital reached 
only $239.8 million, down from 
$435.2 million in 1994. Most econ­
omists believe that the decline is 
rooted in the exchange controls 
imposed in July 1994.
Abide by WTO Ruling?
Venezuela and Brazil became the 
first nations to test U.S. resolve to 
abide by the rulings of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The 
WTO ruled in January that the U.S. 
Clean Air Act imposed standards 
that interfere with free trade. The 
Clinton adm inistration was prepar­
ing to appeal the ruling which 
states, am ong other things, that the 
U.S. must pay trade sanctions until 
1998 if it does not abide by the deci­
sion. WTO guidelines must prevail 
when they are in conflict with envi­
ronm ental standards established by 
specific m em ber countries.
NAFTA Delayed
In late December, the U.S. govern­
m ent dealt another blow to the 
im plem entation of NAFTA by delay­
ing Mexican truckers access to high­
ways in the Southwest. After 
promising not to oppose Mexican 
truckers from entering into New 
Mexico, Arizona and California, 
Secretary Federico Pena gave into 
pressures from border officials, traf­
fic safety groups, the Teamsters and 
politicians seeking to capitalize on 
the anti-NAFTA sentiment. These 
groups noted that Mexican trucks 
do not m eet U.S. safety and other
standards. Mexican truckers, how­
ever, believe that it is all a calculat­
ed attem pt to allow U.S. trucking 
firms to control the market. 
Secretary Pena announced that an 
agreem ent would be signed after a 
new round of talks with Mexican 
officials about improving trucking 
safety.
Government Perks
President Ernesto Samper issued a 
decree on January 18, 1996 that 
seeks to end the perquisites of pub­
lic office. U nder the term s of the 
decree, Colombian government 
functionaries are forbidden from 
travelling in first class and cannot 
host parties with public funds.
They also cannot charge business 
cards, Christmas cards, and person­
al phone calls/faxes to the 
Colombian taxpayers. The objec­
tive of the decree is to reduce pub­
lic spending by approximately $200 
million, but is also part of a cam­
paign to clean up the governm ent’s 
image.
Perks o f Office II
While the Colombians were busy 
cutting governm ent perks,
President Fujimori was defending 
the right of the National Police to 
appropriate for personal use real 
estate confiscated from narcotics 
traffickers. In November 1995, 
press reports stated that eight gen­
erals of the National Police kept for 
themselves luxurious homes in 
Lima that were seized from nar­
cotics gangs. According to the 
report, the homes were used for 
parties with a “lot of liquor and 
num erous young ladies.” President
Fujimori called the reports an 
attem pt by narcotics traffickers to 
force him  to change the leadership 
in the National Police.
Carriers to the Andes
The U.S. D epartm ent of 
Transportation approved a 
Continental Airlines request to be 
allowed to fly to Peru and 
Colombia. Beginning on March 16,
1996, Continental will introduce 
round trip flights between Newark, 
Lima and Bogota. Continental will 
compete with American Airlines for 
the Andean market.
Saved by a Whisker
President Jose Maria Figueres of 
Costa Rica m anaged to keep his 
mustache despite a promise to 
shave it in exchange for a $5,000 
donation from Gillette to the 
National C hildren’s Hospital. The 
kidnapping of two European 
women on January 1 pu t a dam per 
on the shaving ceremony. Standing 
in for President Figueres was 
Costantino Urcuyo, a well-known 
academic and a m em ber of 
Congress, who sacrificed his mus­
tache.
Wine Race
A January 15 Associated France 
Press report noted that Argentina 
has surpassed Chile in the export of 
wine. In 1995, Argentina exported 
182.8 million liters, com pared to 
Chile’s 102.2 million. Spain pur­
chased 84 percent of Argentine 
wine exports. Chile still dominates 
Latin American wine exports to the 
United States. ■
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The Samper Scandal
M ary Beth Sheridan
T
o many people, he sym­
bolized the best and the 
brightest of Latin 
America’s young elite. 
Smart? At a mere 25, 
Ernesto Samper led a 
national banking association. 
Cultured? He had rubbed elbows 
with the wealthy elite since his days 
at an exclusive Bogota prep school. 
Charming? The witty Samper 
endeared himself to big city journal­
ists and coffee bean pickers.
It was not a surprise he would win 
Colombia’s presidency in 1994. But 
today, to the shock of Colombians, 
the onetime golden boy is embroiled 
in South America’s biggest political 
scandal -  battling charges that he 
came to power in a deal with the 
largest cocaine kingpins.
Samper staunchly denies knowing 
leaders of the Cali cartel, which sup­
plies up to 80 percent of U.S. 
cocaine. He says that if any drug 
money entered his campaign, it hap­
pened “behind my back.” He points 
to this administration’s success in dis­
mantling the cartel, jailing six top 
chieftains.
Critics, however, call the 45-year- 
old Samper a tragic symbol of 
Colombia’s recent history. For years, 
many Colombians tolerated drug 
traffickers, even as they quietly 
spread their tentacles through 
Congress, the courts, the police. 
Today, it’s not just Samper who is 
under attack. It’s a country’s history.
H i s t o r ic a l  P e r m is s iv e n e s s
In early 1984, Spanish police burst 
into an elegant apartm ent in down-
Mary Beth Sheridan is a staff urriter 
with The Miami Herald.
town Madrid. They slapped hand­
cuffs on Gilberto Rodriguez 
Orejuela, the Colombian who one 
day would be called chief of the 
world’s cocaine trade.
“If this infiltration [ of drug 
money ]  happened, in no way 
- 1 repeat -  no way did this 
compromise the political will 
of government in the fight 
against drug trafficking. ”
U.S. authorities had already been 
seeking Rodriguez Orejuela for six 
years on trafficking charges. Police 
scooped up thousands of dollars, 
records of his drug shipments and 
address books overflowing with pri­
vate phone numbers. One was 
Ernesto Samper’s.
The book never became public, 
and authorities barely noticed. 
Samper, at the time, was merely a 
Bogota councilman. But even if he 
were more im portant -  then- 
President Belisario Betancur was also 
listed -  many Colombians probably 
would have shrugged it off. “Here 
there was historical permissiveness 
with contraband [smuggled] emer­
alds, drugs,” noted Fernando 
Cepeda, a Colombian political scien­
tist.
The Rodriguez Orejuela brothers
-  Gilberto and Miguel -  were consid­
ered a new breed, “gentlem en” 
smugglers. Although they were want­
ed in the United States, they were 
running legal businesses in 
Colombia -  radio stations, drug 
stores, the Banco de los
Trabajadores. “[Gilberto] was presi­
dent of a bank. The politicians lined 
up to take his money,” noted Patricia 
Lara, publisher of the newsweekly 
Cambio 16.
Samper declined to be interviewed 
for this article or to answer written 
questions.
D a n g e r o u s  L ia is o n s
Cesar Villegas, a businessman with 
an uncanny resemblance to Danny 
de Vito, was the kind of guy a lot of 
Colombians warmed to.
Extroverted. Funny. Generous. He 
and Samper met while they were 
graduate students, and Villegas said 
the friendship grew through the 
years. When Samper, then a presi­
dential candidate, was wounded by a 
gunm an in 1989, Villegas flew in a 
Canadian specialist to operate on his 
friend. Villegas lent Samper his 
Miami apartm ent to recuperate.
‘We had a great affinity,” Villegas 
said. “You only do these things for 
close friends.”
Last year Villegas’ name surfaced 
in taped telephone conversations 
that linked him to the Rodriguez 
Orejuelas. In what was dubbed the 
“narcocassette” scandal, the 
Rodriguez Orejuelas discussed mak­
ing large contributions to Samper's 
campaign. The Cali leaders mention 
meeting with Villegas -  describing 
him as an “emissary” of someone 
seeking funds on behalf of a presi­
dential candidate.
Villegas insists he met the 
Rodriguez Orejuelas only two or 
three times in the mid-1980s when 
all three were investors in the profes­
sional soccer business. “Two or three 
times isn’t anything,” he said. But in 
the fall of 1995, the United States 
pulled Villegas’ visa, in part because
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of concerns raised by the narcocas­
sette scandal, according to U.S. offi­
cials.
Villegas wasn’t Samper’s only dan­
gerous liaison. When Venezuelan 
police broke up an alleged money- 
laundering ring on the Colombian 
border in October 1993, they were 
startled to discover Samper’s home 
phone num ber in the address book 
of financier Sinforoso Caballero, a 
senior Venezuelan judicial source 
said. U.S. intelligence sources sus­
pect Caballero of being a major 
money launderer though his case 
was later overturned on appeal. The 
Venezuelan Supreme Court is consid­
ering the case. Caballero, when con­
tacted by The Miami Herald, denied 
knowing Samper or laundering 
money.
Last August, a more shocking 
friendship came to light. Colombian 
news programs broadcasted a tape of 
Samper chatting warmly by phone 
with Elizabeth Montoya de Sarria, 
the wife of a suspected drug traffick­
er. Samper, in a statement, said the 
Sarrias weren’t under investigation at 
the time of the conversation last year. 
But talk of Jesus Sarria’s alleged traf­
ficking had swirled for years, accord­
ing to Colombian intelligence offi­
cials.
La t t e r  D ay  M o o n s h i n e r s
Rumors about Samper’s past con­
tacts with notorious people so con­
cerned his aides in the 1994 cam­
paign that they warned Samper to be 
careful, a senior Liberal Party politi­
cian said, speaking on condition of 
anonymity. Nevertheless, Samper 
held a key pre-election meeting with 
another presidential hopeful,
General Miguel Maza Marquez, at 
the home of Alberto Giraldo. The
journalist was widely known as a 
“public relations m an” for the 
Rodriguez Orejuelas. Giraldo is now 
in jail on suspicion of accepting car­
tel money.
If Samper’s friendships would be 
unheard of for a U.S. politician, they 
weren’t that unusual in Colombia. 
Over the years, drug traffickers have 
gained increasing influence in poli­
tics and the nation’s favorite sport, 
soccer. Many Colombians felt they 
were hard to avoid.
The Cali Cartel didn’t seem so 
bad. Often pictured in pinstriped 
suits, the Rodriguez Orejuelas 
appeared a cut above the Medellin 
Cartel’s Pablo Escobar, whose group 
was known for assassinating police 
and presidential candidates.
“There was violence [by Cali traf­
fickers] but within the business,” said 
Francisco Thoumi, author of a book 
on drug trafficking. In its zeal to 
track down the violent Escobar, the 
government even worked with help­
ful Cali members, officials said pri­
vately. Of course, not all Colombians 
were blase about the Cali group; 
some scrupulously avoided any links. 
But in a country where much eco­
nomic activity was illegal or semile­
gal, in which the justice system was 
paralyzed and drug use fairly low, 
many people shrugged off drug traf­
fickers as the equivalent of 
Prohibition era moonshiners. “It’s 
unlikely that, just because the United 
States says, ‘this is bad,’ society sees it 
that way,” Thoumi says.
A n  I n v ig o r a t e d  J u s t ic e  S y s t e m
Just a year ago, when the narcocas­
settes first surfaced, the public and 
the press were incredulous. News­
papers quickly buried the implica­
tions about the respected Samper.
“They seemed absurd,” said Maria 
Jim ena Duzan, a prom inent 
Colombian columnist. But it was a 
different Colombia that received the 
news that Samper’s campaign trea­
surer had been arrested in July 1995. 
Stunning the nation, Santiago 
Medina testified that the Samper 
campaign had received at least $6 
million from the Cali Cartel -  per­
haps half the campaign budget. In 
exchange, he said, Samper promised 
to ease conditions for the surrender 
of the drug lords.
Newspapers descended on the 
story with a fury. Times had 
changed. At this point, 13 congress­
men and the national auditor gener­
al were under investigation in a 
probe into drug corruption. It was 
led by Alfonso Valdivieso, the dynam­
ic new attorney general who enjoys 
extraordinary independence under 
Colombia’s 1991 constitution.
Increasingly skeptical newspapers 
pounced on evidence of campaign 
irregularities and contributions from 
alleged traffickers. Even decade-old 
contacts between politicians and car­
tel members became news. The 
newsweekly Cambio 16, for example, 
trum peted a radio license granted to 
Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela by minis­
ter Noemi Sanin in 1986. Sanin, 
who is expected to run for president 
in 1998, has replied that at the time 
Rodriguez Orejuela faced no crimi­
nal charges. “This is the change that 
Valdivieso is causing,” said Lara, pub­
lisher of Cambio 16. ‘This is a most 
im portant change in the country.”
Samper responded to allegations 
about drug money in his campaign 
by pointing to his government’s 
crackdown on the cartels, launched 
last spring under strong U.S. pres­
sure. “If this infiltration [of drug
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money] happened, in no way -  I 
repeat -  no way did this compro­
mise the political will of government 
in the fight against drug trafficking,” 
he told CNN in an interview in 
August 1995. “The tru th  is, at this 
m om ent, six of the seven chiefs of 
the Cali Cartel are prisoners.”
At Samper’s request, a congres­
sional committee investigated 
whether he accepted drug money. 
[The committee found no evidence 
to indict Samper and the U.S. com­
plained that it had not been a very 
serious effort. In any event, Samper 
was cleared.] Three of his top cam­
paign aides are in prison, suspected 
of taking campaign contributions. 
“There has been a radical change, 
said Cepeda, the political scientist. 
“Before people did business [with 
traffickers], bought from them, sold 
to them, went to their parties.
T hat’s history.”
Enrique Parejo, an anti-drug cru­
sader and form er justice minister, 
chalks up the difference to an invig­
orated justice system. “For the first 
time, there is evidence,” Parejo said. 
“The miracle has come in putting 
people in im portant positions who 
looked for evidence -  and found it.”
A change in the easygoing attitude 
of Colombians toward traffickers 
could be crucial for U.S. interests. 
U.S. officials have long been frus­
trated by the traffickers’ ability to 
influence laws and win official 
favors.
Few doubt that the drug lords will 
seek to contribute to future cam­
paigns. But candidates will likely be 
far more careful.
“Samper has tu rned  into a symbol, 
a personification of the rejection of 
drug trafficking, said Enrique 
Santos, managing editor of the 
Bogota daily El Tiempo. “Samper is 
paying for everyone’s broken 
plates.” ■
Revised version of article which 
appeared in The Miami Herald 
November 5, 1995 p i  and 31A.
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BUSINESS REPORTS -  U P C O M IN G
Chile's Accession to NAFTA: Impact and Opportunity
Chile is expected to have minimal immediate economic 
impact on the U.S., yet it is one of Florida's leading trade 
partners. How will Chile's accession affect Florida and 
the U.S.? Accession, Chile's investment climate, general 
policy environment, and trade environment are exam­
ined with special emphasis on Florida.
Annual Hemispheric Trade Report
For the trader, strategist, and economic development 
community, this first Annual Report presents analyses of 
three to five year trends in merchandise trade between 
the U.S., Latin America and the Caribbean. Growth 
commodities and Florida's competitive regions in the 
U.S. will also be identified.
MERCOSUR-Florida Relations
The second largest trading bloc within the Americas, 
MERCOSUR is an enigma to many businesses. This 
report examines MERCOSUR with an eye to understand­
ing its business climate, and is directed to business and 
industry executives.
Association o f Caribbean States (ACS)
Newly created, the ACS is the second leading region for 
Florida's trade with the Americas. It also encompasses 
most of the smaller economies in the hemisphere. What 
is the ACS, and are there opportunities for Florida's com­
mercial sector?
Summit of the Americas Center
F L O R I D A  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  U N I V E R I S T Y
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environmental s o l u t i o n s  f o r  the world
The Hemispheric Center for Environmental Technology (HCET) 
and the Tatin American and Caribbean Center 
would like to announce the formation of their partnership
HCET's vision is to become a model bridging institute in the Western Hemisphere 
for diffusing environmental technologies that promote mutual economic 
benefit and sustainable development in the United States and the Americas.
HCET's mission is to develop and market technologies for 
solving environmental problems throughout the Americas.
HCET encourages the development and use of sustainable technologies as a 
means of preserving the environment while fostering economic development.
HCET offers the following benefits to partners 
in the U.S., Latin America, and the Caribbean:
• Science and engineering capabilities 
• Cost-effective technology development 
• Technology assessment 
• Access to markets and technology resources
For more information, contact: 
M l  Ebadian, Ph.D. 
Hemispheric Center for Environmental Technology 
Florida International University 
Voice (305) 348-4238/FAX (305) 348-4176 
E-mail: ebadian@eng.fiu.edu 
World Wide Web Site: http://www.fiu.edu/~hcet
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The Art of Narcofunding
Eduardo A. Gamarra
I
n the past decade, Latin 
American democracy has 
been defined largely by the 
holding of regular and com­
petitive elections. Every coun­
try has placed a great deal of 
weight on the electoral ritual that 
occurs every two, four, five, a n d /o r  
six years. W ithout a doubt, periodic 
electoral contests are crucial to the 
deepening of the democratization 
process in the region.
The prevalence of elections, how­
ever, has brought to the surface a 
disturbing trend: allegations of illicit 
funds entering electoral campaigns. 
In the past two years, political par­
ties and their candidates in Bolivia 
and Colombia have been charged 
with receiving campaign contribu­
tions from narcotics traffickers. 
Candidates in other countries have 
succumbed to the same type of elec­
toral financing. Those who have 
rem ained immune to this trend are 
likely to face similar situations in the 
near future.
Two reasons account for this 
trend. First, running for office in 
Latin America has become a very 
expensive venture. The costs of hir­
ing U.S. consultants, conducting sur­
veys, and m ounting electoral 
machines have skyrocketed in the 
past few years, forcing parties to 
turn  primarily to the drug industry. 
The absence of large private sector 
donors and fund-raising campaigns 
has also contributed to this disturb­
ing trend.
Eduardo A. Gamarra, is editor of 
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Second, as in most democratic sys­
tems, the sad reality is that money 
buys votes and influences policy. 
Increasingly, traffickers have 
attem pted to purchase candidates 
with the objective of securing favor­
able treatment, interrupting efforts 
to conduct counternarcotics opera­
tions, and securing policy initiatives 
that favor their industry. In this 
sense, drug traffickers behave no dif­
ferently than the average corporate 
donor to a U.S. campaign.
The U.S. has confronted a 
very significant dilemma. 
Promoting democracy and 
free elections has come 
up against the reality of 
illicit drug tainted 
campaign funds.
Because no laws exist prohibiting 
drug lords from contributing to the 
electoral campaigns of their favorite 
candidates, the situation in Latin 
America is particularly difficult. No 
country in the region has adopted 
serious campaign financing reform 
legislation. Thus, all electoral cam­
paigns in the future will be affected 
in some measure by the presence of 
illicit funds.
In this context, the U.S. has con­
fronted a very significant dilemma. 
Promoting democracy and free elec­
tions has come up against the reality 
of illicit drug tainted campaign 
funds. Responding to this issue has 
not been easy and has led to trying 
circumstances in the immediate
past, especially when the winning 
candidates are the ones under suspi­
cion. This situation has occurred 
twice in the past six years. Jaime Paz 
Zamora of Bolivia in 1989, and 
Ernesto Samper of Colombia in 
1994 allegedly accepted funds from 
traffickers to run their campaigns. 
This essay compares the narcotics- 
related funding in Bolivia and 
Colombia and examines U.S. 
responses in each case.
D r u g s , L ie s  a n d  V id e o t a p e s
In 1988, as Bolivia prepared to 
enter into its national electoral 
cycle, videos and pictures compro­
mising nearly every major political 
party with drug lords surfaced. 
Despite a great deal of U.S. concern, 
these were quickly brushed aside 
and the campaign went on as sched­
uled.
Despite placing third in 1989, the 
Movimiento de hquierda Revolu- 
cionaria’s (MIR) Jaim e Paz Zamora 
became president of Bolivia thanks 
to a congressional runoff. Paz 
Zamora, a promising Social 
Democrat, was one of the prom inent 
figures posing in the so-called narco- 
fotos with Isaac “Oso” Chavarria, con­
sidered one of Bolivia’s top drug 
traffickers. Accusations surfaced 
that Chavarria had donated 
$100,000 to the MIR’s campaign.
U.S. drug enforcement agents and 
then U.S. ambassador Robert S. 
Gelbard were aware of the allega­
tions. Arguing that Bolivian democ­
racy was too fragile, they did nothing 
to make the issue public. Instead, 
prom inent MIR members socialized 
with Gelbard and continued their 
cozy relationship with Chavarria. 
Gelbard did note, however, his con­
cerns about drug-related corruption
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to his superiors in Washington but, 
at least in the initial rounds, did 
nothing to bring the issue to public 
light.
In his few years as ambassador, 
Gelbard established a huge coun­
ternarcotics bureaucracy in Bolivia, 
by far the largest in Latin America. 
Was knowledge of Paz Zamora’s 
links with Chavarria used to justify 
the construction of this huge enter­
prise? Were U.S. interests best 
served by keeping the information 
about Paz Zamora a secret?
During Paz Zamora’s four years in 
office, the U.S. established a series 
of rigid counternarcotics param e­
ters. It sought and obtained the 
eradication of coca fields, designed 
an extradition law, and militarized 
the entire counternarcotics effort in 
Bolivia as both a militarized police 
and regular units of the armed 
forces participated in operations 
throughout the country.
Paz Zamora and his most promi­
nent supporters, however, played a 
strange game of chicken with the 
United States and with Gelbard.
Each time a counternarcotics opera­
tion was to occur, information was 
leaked to traffickers, forcing the U.S. 
to keep Bolivians out of the loop. In 
1991, Paz Zamora nam ed Colonel 
Fausdno Rico Toro to head the 
Fuerza Especial de Lucha Contra el 
Narcotrafico. Rico Toro was known to 
have had a long involvement with 
drug trafficking. Ambassador 
Gelbard cut off U.S. assistance, Rico 
Toro resigned and business seemed 
to go on as usual in bilateral rela­
tions. Subsequent ministers of inte­
rior, FELCN commanders and oth­
ers were allegedly tainted by the 
drug industry as well. Still the U.S. 
funded Bolivia and certified the Paz
Zamora governm ent’s compliance 
with anti-drug efforts.
Paz Zamora stepped down in 
August 1993 and went about his 
duties as a form er president. He 
was invited to the Wilson Center, he 
was invited to serve on an interna­
tional peace negotiating team in 
Chiapas, and prepared himself to 
run for re-election in 1997. In 
February 1994, however, the U.S. 
tu rned  over information linking Paz 
Zamora to Chavarria. Every piece 
of inform ation was the same as what 
was available in 1988 in the video­
tapes and photographs. With Paz 
Zamora out of office, the conse­
quences on Bolivian democracy 
were less significant but in some 
measure destabilizing. The current 
Sanchez de Lozada government 
launched a major investigation into 
Paz Zam ora’s so-called narcovinculos 
and jailed prom inent members of 
the MIR. For all intents and pur­
poses, Paz Zamora’s re-election bid 
in 1997 has been halted. And, the 
U.S. has canceled the form er presi­
d en t’s multiple entry visa into the 
U.S.
In short, U.S. interests may have 
been best served by working with 
Paz Zamora despite evidence link­
ing him and his party to prom inent 
drug traffickers. Moreover, Bolivian 
democracy survived because the 
U.S. chose not to accuse a sitting 
president with narcolinks.
S a m p e r g a t e
Allegations of narcofunding of 
electoral campaigns in Colombia 
have been around for at least a 
decade. None, however, ever 
reached the proportions of the cur­
rent scandal involving President 
Ernesto Samper. The events are
rather well known. In mid-May
1994, shortly after being defeated in 
the second round, Conservative 
party candidate Andres Pastrana 
announced that he had come across 
tapes linking Ernesto Sam per’s cam­
paign to the Cali Cartel. The tapes 
revealed a conversation between 
Alberto Giraldo, a rather controver­
sial journalist and presumed 
spokesperson for the Cali Cartel, 
and one of the Rodriguez Orejuela 
brothers. Presenting himself as an 
interm ediary for the Liberal Party, 
Giraldo requested a contribution 
from the Cali Cartel.
Ernesto Samper denied all allega­
tions, suggesting that they were part 
of Pastrana’s effort to become presi­
dent despite the electoral defeat. 
State D epartm ent and DEA officials, 
however, believed that there was 
substance to the charges. State 
D epartm ent officials m et with 
Samper in New York City before his 
inauguration in mid- 1994 to warn 
him o f the possible consequences 
on U.S.-Colombian relations if the 
charges were not investigated and 
cleared. Nonetheless, Samper was 
inaugurated president. Shortly 
thereafter, Republicans in the U.S. 
Congress pushed for increasing 
pressure on Colombia, pressed for 
decertification, and for the imposi­
tion of trade sanctions. The DEA 
and State D epartm ent initiated a 
much less publicized campaign to 
force Samper to come clean.
Despite State D epartm ent and 
DEA concerns, the Colombian situa­
tion was placed on the backburner 
while the Clinton administration 
em barked on the planning of the 
Summit of the Americas. For most 
of 1994, the U.S. said little in public 
about the electoral funding scheme.
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In the context of the Summit of 
the Americas planning process, 
Colombia put forth a proposal to 
com bat money laundering, which 
went on to become part of the 
Summit Action Plan signed by all 34 
heads of state who attended the 
December 1994 event in Miami. On 
a few occasions both President Bill 
Clinton and Vice President A1 Gore 
praised Samper for Colombia’s 
efforts to combat drugs. These 
com m endations did not reflect the 
underlying tensions between 
Washington and Bogota and caught 
U.S. drug enforcem ent officials off 
guard.
While Samper looked good in 
Miami pledging to combat money 
laundering, the reality in Colombia 
was quite different. The Colombian 
Congress refused to pass a law that 
would have looked into illicit 
sources of fortunes. It also did not 
consider campaign financing 
reform  proposals.
In sharp contrast to the feel good 
ambiance of the Miami Summit, in 
March 1995 the U.S. Congress 
approved President C linton’s rec­
om m endation that Colombia 
receive “national interest certifica­
tion,” a new category that essentially 
placed Colombia in a situation of 
noncom pliance with counternar­
cotics efforts. Moreover, the DEA’s 
main m an in Bogota departed 
Colombia labeling the country a 
“narcodemocracy.” This partial cer­
tification and the DEA’s comments 
sparked a great deal of Colombian 
nationalism and added to a pattern 
of general deterioration of U.S.- 
Colombian relations.
To mitigate U.S. pressure, Samper 
em barked what m ight be term ed 
the most significant offensive ever 
launched against the Cali Cartel. In 
one year, six prom inent members of 
the Cali Cartel were arrested, 
including the Rodriguez Orejuela 
brothers and Jose Santa Cruz 
Londono. Sam per’s efforts aimed 
to dem onstrate to Washington that
if his campaign in 1994 had been 
funded by traffickers, he would not 
have brought them  down so quickly.
The U.S. faces two options: 
to pursue a public and 
moral crusade to force 
corrupt politicians out of 
office and generate a great 
deal of turmoil, instability, 
and anti-americanism; or, to 
design a covert effort to 
force corrupt government 
officials in Latin America to 
accept counternarcotics 
operations in the name of 
saving democracy.
Despite these efforts, the U.S. 
viewed the Colombian situation with 
skepticism. Questions regarding the 
campaign financing scandal were 
still there. The allegations against 
Samper and the Liberal Party 
became m ore significant as key peo­
ple in the campaign, such as 
Santiago Medina, the treasurer, 
came forth with accusations that the 
president knew of the scheme to 
solicit funds from the Cali Cartel. 
Moreover, the U.S. was uncertain 
about the sentences to be imposed 
on Cali drug traffickers and the 
ability of the Colombian govern­
m ent to keep them  in prison. The 
dramatic escape of Jose Santa Cruz 
Londono in January 1996 con­
firmed U.S. concerns.
To fight accusations of a cover-up, 
Samper nam ed a congressional 
commission to look into the 
charges. In theory, the congression­
al commission could have found 
enough evidence to initiate an 
impeachment-like process against 
Samper. In late September, Samper
faced nine hours of questioning by 
the congressional commission.
The investigation into the scandal 
and U.S. counternarcotics efforts in 
Colombia received a considerable 
boost when Guillermo Palomari, the 
form er treasurer of the Cali Cartel, 
tu rned  himself over to U.S. authori­
ties. Once in U.S. territory, 
Palomari’s revelations to the DEA 
confirm ed many of the statements 
provided by Santiago Medina.
On December 6, 1995, the 
congressional commission appoint­
ed by Samper to look into the alle­
gations ruled that it had found no 
evidence to indict the president.
U.S. authorities expressed disbelief 
and accused the congressional com­
mission of having ruled on a parti­
san basis. In W ashington’s eyes, the 
ruling confirm ed suspicions that a 
well orchestrated cover-up was in 
the works. U.S. reaction again 
sparked nationalistic cries and accu­
sations of intrusion into Colombia’s 
domestic affairs. Given the congres­
sional ruling, the U.S. placed all of 
its hopes on the investigation 
launched in early 1995 by Attorney 
General Alfonso Valdivieso. 
Valdivieso was widely supported by 
U.S. authorities who perceived him 
as honest. Valdivieso’s investigation, 
however, was lengthy and slow.
Events in Colombia moved very 
quickly following the congressional 
clearing of Samper. The U.S. stood 
by silently as major actors in the 
drug funding scandal confirmed the 
allegations. The most serious 
occurred on January 22, 1996 when 
form er defense minister and cam­
paign m anager Fernando Botero 
told a Colombian news team and 
the U.S.-based Univision television 
network that he had known of the 
payments, that Samper had lied all 
along, and that a cover-up had been 
orchestrated.
Calls for Sam per’s resignation 
came from nearly every sector of 
Colombian society. U.S. State 
Departm ent and DEA officials kept
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silent in public but acknowledged in 
private conversations their desire to 
have Samper step down. In the 
meantime, U.S. officials prepared 
the annual certification report for 
Congress. With Samper clinging to 
office, U.S. decertification and the 
imposition of trade sanctions 
appeared a very distinct possibility.
In short, U.S. drug policy in 
Colombia went through four phases. 
First, State Departm ent officials 
headed by Robert Gelbard sought to 
confront Samper, presumably to 
force an early resignation. Second, 
the U.S. chose to keep the narco­
funding scandal out of the public 
limelight while the Summit of the 
Americas was in the works. Third, it 
waited for Colombian congressional 
and judicial authorities to investigate 
Samper and simultaneously applied 
national interest certification.
Finally, the U.S. applied a silent 
approach, hoping that Samper 
would resign without signs of direct 
interference from Washington. Did 
this approach work or did it con­
tribute to the most serious political 
crisis faced by Colombia since at 
least the 1950s?
C o n c l u s i o n
U.S. responses in these two cases 
highlight the complexity of dealing 
with the proliferation of narcofund­
ing of Latin American electoral cam­
paigns. Supporting democracy and 
pursuing drug policy has proven to 
be quite difficult when elected offi­
cials cater to traffickers and solicit 
campaign contributions from them.
From the comparison between Paz 
Zamora and Samper, one conclusion 
might be that in the interests of 
maintaining political stability and 
furthering U.S. interests, the allega­
tions ought to be handled privately. 
The outcome in Bolivia was clear. 
U.S. policy interests were served in 
the short term as the government 
followed Washington drug policy 
dictates. At the same time, Bolivia’s 
incipient democracy was maintained.
In Colombia, the very public bat­
tle between U.S. officials and the 
Samper government has created a 
very tense situation in bilateral rela­
tions and, more significantly, has 
precipitated the country’s worst 
political crisis of the second half of 
the 1900s. The situation in Colombia 
is different in scale to the Bolivia in 
that it draws a lot more attention in 
the United States because of the Cali 
Cartel specter. Nevertheless, it is not 
clear at this juncture whether U.S. 
interests have been served best by 
the public trial of President Samper.
Finally, despite the Paz Zamora 
and Samper experiences, it is unlike­
ly that Latin American political par­
ties and their candidates will refuse 
funds from drug lords to fund their 
electoral campaigns. Campaign 
financing reform  laws are unlikely 
in the near future, drug trafficking 
is not likely to slow down, and 
democratic elections are likely to 
continue. The U.S. faces two 
options: to pursue a public and 
moral crusade to force corrupt 
politicians out of office and gener­
ate a great deal of turmoil, instabili­
ty, and anti-Americanism; or, to 
design a covert effort to force cor­
rup t governm ent officials in Latin 
America to accept counternarcotics 
operations in the nam e of saving 
democracy. I
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In the Balance
D avid Pion-Berlin
I
n Argentina, military subordi­
nation to civilian control is 
hardly a topic of conversation 
anymore. The army’s accep­
tance of democracy is pre­
sumed and serves only as a 
point of departure for serious dis­
cussion on other matters, such as 
the m odernization of defense, 
Argentina’s role in the new world 
order, or its participation in United 
Nations-sponsored peacekeeping 
missions abroad. Those who are 
familiar with Argentina’s militarized 
past and its historically weak civilian 
institutions may bristle at the notion 
that the praetorian era is a thing of 
the past. They may conclude that 
current Argentine views reflect wish­
ful thinking more than realistic 
appraisals of the balance of force. 
Perhaps it is too soon to write off 
the arm ed forces as a powerful and 
dangerous political actor, but there 
may be something to this new found 
air of optimism.
The unobstructed transfer of 
power from a Radical Party govern­
m ent to a Peronist government on 
July 8, 1989, marked an im portant 
milestone in the process of democ­
ratic reconstruction. Not since the 
1920s had one elected president 
peacefully transferred power to 
another, with the military sitting qui­
etly on the sidelines. Now with 
Carlos M enem ’s re-election as presi­
dent, the pattern of orderly democ­
ratic succession continues. Perhaps 
the greatest test of compliance has 
been the military’s extraordinary
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restraint in the face of declining pre­
rogatives and a diminished sphere 
of influence. Reductions in the mili­
tary budget for salaries, operations 
and procurem ent, the privatization 
of military holdings, the term ination 
of im portant missile projects, and 
legislative restraints on all internal 
security missions were both unprece­
dented and unrelenting. All went 
virtually unchallenged by the armed 
forces.
Those who are familiar 
with Argentina’s militarized 
past and its historically 
weak civilian institutions 
may bristle at the notion 
that the praetorian era is a 
thing of the past.
The arm ed forces is still an im por­
tant institution with its own interests 
to defend, but there is a great differ­
ence between the extralegal forms 
of military pressure used in the past 
and the institutionalized pressure 
exhibited today. With few excep­
tions, the military’s objections to 
policy are expressed through proper 
channels. Officials privately and 
diplomatically register their com­
plaints with the defense minister, 
while military enlaces (lobbyists) take 
their cause directly to the Congress.
When so many scholars have 
insisted for so long that military cor­
porate interests must be satisfied to 
secure compliance, it is curious 
indeed that an equilibrium has been 
achieved in Argentina, despite the
losses suffered by the arm ed ser­
vices. Who or what is ultimately 
responsible for this state of affairs?
E q u i l i b r i u m
These achievements began prior 
to the current Menem and the pre­
vious Alfonsin administrations. 
Perhaps the first steps toward equi­
librium were the military’s own self­
destructive acts. The unquestion­
able political and economic failures 
of the Proceso de Reorganization 
National (Proceso), along with 
Argentina’s defeat in the 1982 War 
of the South Atlantic (Malvinas/ 
Falklands), left indelible marks on 
the m en of arms and the society 
they had refused to serve. The mili­
tary was stained by its participation 
in a regime notorious for repression, 
self aggrandizement and incompe­
tence. Argentine society bore the 
b run t of this and held the armed 
forces both morally and politically 
responsible.
The Proceso ju n ta  presided over a 
ruined economy and turned a limit­
ed counterinsurgency operation into 
a dirty war against civilians. The 
resulting loss of faith in program ­
matic objectives led to the em er­
gence of serious cleavages along per­
sonalities, branches of service and 
ideologies. These contributed not 
only to the regim e’s hasty demise, 
but to a profound demoralization of 
the profession itself. This condition 
was then exacerbated by defeat in 
war and subsequent revelation of 
deficient, improvisational and error- 
ridden military conduct. The 
arm ed forces’ dismal perform ance 
in governance and in war con­
tributed to the degeneration of the 
institution, allowing incoming civil­
ian governments to accomplish far
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m ore than would have been possible 
in the absence of military defeat.
Alfonsin led the charge, using the 
power of his office to further restrict 
the military’s political reach, punish 
it for past offenses and curb its eco­
nomic appetite. His program 
heightened the military’s fears 
about the new democratic order, as 
it sought to impose, rather than 
court, military subordination to civil­
ian rule. The reduction of military 
prerogatives, without sufficient com­
pensation, contributed to deep 
resentm ent at the middle and lower 
ranks, eventually spilling over the 
rebellions of 1987 and 1988.
It is easy to blame Alfonsin for the 
nation’s instability and to credit 
Menem for the restoration of that 
stability. But it would be a mistake 
to suggest that the Radical Party 
chief did nothing more than 
bequeath to his successor a prob­
lematic civil-military relationship. 
Whatever else can be said about 
Alfonsin’s hum an rights strategy, the 
sentencing of the ex-commandants 
weakened the principle of impunity 
and made evident the democratic 
regim e’s refusal to allow military 
transgressions to go unanswered. In 
setting new limits, Alfonsin altered 
the param eters of the civil-military 
game, creating opportunities for his 
successors to interact with the 
arm ed forces without the fear of a 
military coup. Menem could reward 
good behavior knowing that to con­
cede was not to capitulate; that one 
reward would not unleash a torrent 
of new and unreasonable military 
demands which, if unfulfilled, would 
generate calls for a change of 
regime. Conversely, Menem could 
withhold rewards to the armed 
forces in order to husband or redis­
tribute scarce resources, confident 
that the arm ed forces would abide 
by the decision.
Fa c in g  D o w n  t h e  “ C a r a p in t a d a s ”
The new civil-military equilibrium 
also owes its existence to the m an­
ner in which both Alfonsin and 
Menem dealt with the military 
rebels, or carapintadas (painted 
faces) as they were called. After the 
Holy Week revolt of April 1987, the 
ruling Radical Party lost some 
ground by calling for a partial 
amnesty for hum an rights offenders. 
The move was widely perceived as 
caving in to rebellious colonel Aldo 
Rico. But in other aspects, Alfonsin 
held his ground. He refused to 
yield to their dem ands that the next 
chief of the army be selected from a 
list of five candidates hand-picked by 
Rico, and instead appointed General 
Jose Dante Caridi. He did not grant 
immunity to the rebels, and had his 
military com m and manipulate 
assignments and promotions in a 
way that marginalized Rico’s loyal­
ists.
With the appointm ent of General 
Caridi, Alfonsin established a prece­
dence of defying the carapintadas. 
This continued under Menem, who, 
over the objection of the carapin­
tadas’ All Seineldin, designated 
General Isidro Caceres as the new 
army head. Beginning with Caceres, 
each subsequent prom otion within 
the army weakened the hand of the 
carapintadas while strengthening the 
hand of the “pure professional,” 
men like Caceres who were linked 
neither to mutiny nor bureaucratic 
inaction. As pure professionals, 
these soldiers are strict observers of 
military rank and, for the most part, 
remain uncompromisingly subordi­
nate to the constitutional order and 
its elected officials. General Martin 
Bonnet, Caceres’s successor, and 
General Martin Balza, the current 
head of the army’s general staff, fall 
into these categories. Personnel 
changes of this sort have produced a 
military com m and which is both 
respected by the rank and file and 
respectful of the governing authori­
ties.
M enem ’s contribution to the cur­
ren t state of civil-military relations is 
often misunderstood. It is taken for 
granted that his October 1989 par­
don of some 216 officers charged 
with mutiny and hum an rights abus­
es paved the way for improved rela­
tions. But balancing his forgiveness 
was the firmness with which he 
responded to the abortive coup 
attem pt of December 1990. The 
uprising, which resulted in 13 
deaths (two of the victims were sol­
diers) and 350 injuries, was particu­
larly embarrassing to the president, 
coming as it did on the eve of a 
scheduled visit to Argentina by for­
mer U.S. President George Bush. 
The angry commander-in-chief 
quickly ordered troops to extinguish 
the uprising and urged the Military 
Supreme Council to mete out stiff 
punishm ent for the perpetrators. 
Fifteen co-conspirators, including 
Seineldin, lost their military status 
and remain behind bars
Like Alfonsin before him, Menem 
set careful limits on permissible mili­
tary action. But unlike Alfonsin, the 
Peronist leader has also been able to 
establish a rapport with the armed 
services. There is a mutual under­
standing and respect which has 
translated into greater self-restraint 
on the part of the military. With the 
burden of prosecution for past
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transgressions lifted, but with the 
knowledge that future ones will not 
be tolerated, the officer corps has 
cooperated with policies that in 
another time and context would 
have been intolerable.
C a v a l l o , C a n  y o u  S p a r e  a  D im e ?
Nowhere is this more apparent 
than with the military budget.
While defense expenditures plum­
m eted by 40 percent during the first 
three years of the Alfonsin adminis­
tration, cuts were even steeper and 
more sustained under Menem. 
Military spending as a percentage 
of gross domestic product (GDP) 
went from 2.75 percent in 
Alfonsin’s last year to 2.15 percent 
in M enem ’s first year, to less than 2 
percent thereafter. The army’s bud­
get (not expenditures) went from 
560 million pesos in 1987 to 105 
million by 1991, an 81 percent 
decline. By 1993, there was no 
money left in the accounts of either 
the army, air force or navy for new 
equipm ent or m aintenance. To 
date, this situation has not 
improved, although modest salary 
measures are projected to make the 
new all-volunteer army more attrac­
tive to recruits. Unable to support 
themselves or their families on mea­
ger military salaries, many officers 
leave the barracks by midday to 
hold down jobs in the civilian sec­
tor. O thers have simply abandoned 
the services all together. But by and 
large, the arm ed forces have accept­
ed these changes.
The objective of the M enem gov­
ernm ent has not been to punish the 
arm ed forces, but rather to fulfill 
macroeconomic goals as set by the 
all-powerful economics minister, 
Domingo Cavallo. Among 
Argentine defense specialists, the 
consensus is that limits to military 
spending are established by Cavallo 
and no one else. And for Cavallo, 
there are three compelling reasons 
why the arm ed forces must try to 
make do with less.
The first is that all sectors in 
Argentine society have been called 
on to do exactly the same. The 
watchwords under Menem have 
been “shared sacrifice.” In spread­
ing the costs of austerity, the gov­
ernm ent has been able to diffuse 
opposition to what surely has been 
a painful adjustm ent program. And 
it is that program , Cavallo claims, 
which has allowed the nation to 
experience an impressive economic 
recovery, marked by the elim ination 
of the fiscal deficit, the lowering of 
monthly inflation to less than a per­
centage point in 1995 (and a nega­
tive rate for the m onth of August) 
and the restoration of stability and 
growth to an economy that had 
seen neither in decades.
In coming to terms with 
its own disreputable past, 
the military has helped 
rehabilitate its standing.
The Argentine nation 
is the beneficiary.
The second reason, equally per­
suasive, is that the nation no longer 
needs a large military because the 
threatening environm ent of the 
past has changed. The war with 
Great Britain is over, tensions with 
Chile have been eased considerably 
through the signing of border 
agreements, and A rgentina’s peren­
nial rival to the north, Brazil, is now 
an economic partner in the newly 
created free-trade zone known as 
MERCOSUR. Cooperation and 
integration, rather than geopolitical 
rivalry, characterizes relations 
between these Southern Cone 
neighbors, rendering the military 
threat to A rgentina’s sovereignty 
lower than it has been in recent 
memory. Since defensive needs are 
assessed in proportion to risk, then
significant spending reductions 
were probably warranted.
Third, Argentina is a perfect test 
case of the theorem  that bigger is 
not necessarily better. In 1982, the 
country’s 200,000-man military, with 
an impressive stockpile of weapons, 
and a 37 percent share of all public 
sector expenditures (compared to 
16.6 percent in Chile), went down in 
defeat at the hands of the British. 
Rapacious military spending could 
not purchase the kind of defense 
the country needed. Now, the mili­
tary command is the first to admit 
that what Argentina needs is a lean­
er, more efficient, and more cost 
effective fighting force.
The downsizing of the Argentine 
military has been going on for some 
time now. Army conscripts, who 
num bered 64,640 in 1983, were 
down to just 13,000 by 1992. A 
m em ber of the army’s general staff 
reported in 1993 a 12 percent 
decline in the officer corps, and an 
overall 32 percent reduction in army 
units -  including corps (40 percen t), 
brigade commands (8.3 percent) 
artillery commands (100 percent), 
and logistical units (54 percent) -  all 
between 1983-1992. The report 
goes on to describe changes in the 
organic structure of the army, the 
movement of combat brigades and 
regiments, and the redeploym ent of 
troops, all allegedly guided by strate­
gic logic to transform the army into 
an organization that is “agile, versa­
tile, flexible and courageous.”
While many of these changes have 
actually occurred, it is dubious that 
such transformations have been 
carefully orchestrated by strategic 
design. What is more probable is 
that the army, and the military in 
general, have simply taken com pen­
satory measures to conform to a 
budget which is 70 percent smaller 
than it was a decade ago.
This kind of knee-jerk downsizing 
that responds to economic logic 
without sufficient regard for the 
security needs of the country has
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many Argentine defense specialists 
concerned. Strategically-minded 
structural reform is the solution, but 
the military cannot or will not 
reform itself. Unfortunately, clear 
guidelines from the political authori­
ties have not been forthcoming. As 
expected, years of persistent budget- 
cutting without reform has set limits 
on military tolerance. By 1993, 
according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the military’s operating capacity was 
at a meager 20 percent (compared 
to 60 percent on the eve of the 
Malvinas War) This alarming statis­
tic ushered negotiations with 
Defense Minister Oscar Camilion, 
where Cavallo finally agreed to raise 
the ceiling on military expenditures 
with a 22 percent increase in supple­
mental funding for housing, cloth­
ing and other personnel-related 
items. Shortly thereafter, he 
approved the procurem ent of 36 
U.S. skyhawk A-4M training planes 
needed to replace roughly one-half 
of the aircraft lost in the Malvinas 
War.
A N e w  C i v i l - M i l i t a r y  C u l t u r e
This agreement perhaps best typi­
fies the new civil-military climate in 
Argentina. Conflicts of interest and 
perception among the arm ed ser­
vices, the Ministry of Defense, and 
the rest of the government persist, 
but do not explode into full-scale 
confrontation. Contacts are rou- 
tinized, and problems are solved 
within the framework of institutions.
But more impressive than the rap­
prochem ent between the military 
and executive branch has been the 
discovery of common ground 
between the military and civil society. 
Before, each side remained incom­
municado with the other, unable or 
unwilling to break through the barri­
ers of distrust. These days, not a 
m onth goes by in Argentina without 
contact between military and civilian 
defense specialists. What began as a 
single sociology seminar on defense 
issues held at the University of
Buenos Aires in 1984, has blossomed 
into a near perm anent civil-military 
dialogue made possible through the 
creation of a host of organizations 
dedicated to bringing together 
experts from both sides. Military 
and civilian research centers, com­
missions with the Peronist and 
Radical parties, and even the jo in t 
military command itself have spon­
sored initiatives to produce a cross­
fertilization of opinions and ideas.
As a result, a small but viable 
“defense establishment” not only 
yields defense-related knowledge but 
also perpetuates the new culture of 
openness between soldiers and citi­
zens.
This new culture is remarkable in 
light of recent history. As a result of 
the “Dirty War” and its acts of terror, 
the military thoroughly disgraced 
and ostracized itself from the larger 
Argentine community. But recently, 
the armed forces have gone a long 
way toward bridging the gulf that 
separated it from society through 
demonstrations of remorse. 
Revelations of misdeeds by under­
lings have led senior commanders to 
acknowledge that their services com­
mitted legally and morally unaccept­
able acts. The army chief went fur­
thest, stating that both those who 
gave the orders and those who fol­
lowed were responsible. In coming 
to terms with its own disreputable 
past, the military has helped rehabili­
tate its standing. The Argentine 
nation is the beneficiary.
C h a l l e n g e s  o n  t h e  H o r i z o n
The first challenge is an institu­
tional one. Unfortunately, the 
Ministry of Defense still represents a 
weak link in the chain of command. 
Under Menem, officials with no par­
ticular background in defense have 
been appointed temporarily for 
political reasons, only to be with­
drawn when convenient. Rapid per­
sonnel turnover results in disconti­
nuity, which in turn breeds unfamil­
iarity and institutional memory fail­
ure. The pattern can only be broken 
if the Menem government and its 
successors begin to acknowledge the 
critical importance of the defense 
ministry in maintaining good rela­
tions with the armed forces.
The current lack of ministerial 
continuity and expertise commonly 
translates into lack of will, which 
poses the next challenge to 
Argentina, namely one of leadership. 
Until the president and his ministeri­
al appointees step up to the plate to 
establish clear defense and security 
goals for the nation, further progress 
is unlikely. The chief executive must 
have defense vision, which the 
defense minister and his staff can 
then translate into concrete objec­
tives, strategies and programs.
Indeed, the Law of Defense requires 
the minister and his advisory council 
to elaborate all hypotheses of con­
flict and war, and to direct and coor­
dinate all those defense activities not 
already delegated to the president.
To date, the lack of presidential and 
ministerial leadership has created a 
vacuum which the armed services 
themselves might be tem pted to fill.
Finally, Menem must avoid the 
temptation to subordinate all 
defense needs to economic criteria. 
To date, he has deferred to 
Domingo Cavallo, his economics 
minister, who has held the defense 
budget hostage to short-term fiscal 
fluctuations. This prevents the ser­
vices from undertaking reforms 
based on long-term strategic fore­
casting. Instead, according to the 
director of Naval Programming and 
Budgeting, they must now resort to 
“situation planning” based on cur­
rent budgetary realities. In the 
future, there must be a balance 
between economic and military 
necessities, if the arm ed forces are to 
thoroughly modernize and profes­
sionalize. Reason must prevail at the 
political level as Argentina advances 
toward civilian control over the 
armed forces and democratic consol­
idation. ■
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The Second Coming
Aldo C. Vacs
O
n July 8, 1995, Carlos 
S. Menem began his 
second term as presi­
dent of Argentina. 
Following in the foot­
steps of Juan 
Domingo Peron, the founder of the 
Peronist movement and the only 
Argentine president elected to two 
consecutive terms, Menem promoted 
a constitutional am endm ent allowing 
his re-election and won an impressive 
majority in the May 1995 electoral 
contest. Under the terms of the 
1994 constitutional reform, the presi­
dential period was shortened from 
six to four years. M enem’s presiden­
cy will last until July 1999.
Unlike Peron’s attempt, the legality 
of the 1994 constitutional reform was 
not disputed by the opposition. It 
was generally accepted that Menem’s 
victory had been secured observing 
all liberal democratic procedures.
For the first time since 1930, 
Argentina completed more than one 
decade of uninterrupted democracy 
in a political climate in which the 
opposition endorsed the legitimacy 
of the elected authorities and the 
military remained subordinated to 
them. Constitutional guarantees and 
freedoms were respected, there was 
lively political competition, and a 
large majority of the population, 
despite socioeconomic problems, 
supported the preservation of the 
democratic regime.
T h e  I n it ia l  C o n d i t i o n s
The general elections of May 1995 
confirmed Argentina’s changing 
political configuration. The ruling
Aldo C. Vacs is associate professor of 
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Partido Justicialista (Justice Party -  PJ) 
obtained a comfortable victory. 
Menem gathered close to 50 percent 
of the votes, making it unnecessary 
to organize a runoff presidential 
election. The PJ won most congres­
sional and gubernatorial races, 
increased its majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies to 133 seats -  
thereby securing its own quorum  -  
and captured 10 of the 14 governor­
ships in dispute. In contrast, the 
main opposition party, the Union 
Civica Radical (Radical Civic Union -  
UCR) suffered a major defeat, gath­
ering less than 17 percent of the 
votes, losing a num ber of congres­
sional seats, and winning in only four 
provinces. The runner-up in the 
elections was a new center-left coali­
tion, the Frente del Pais Solidano 
(Front for a Solidarity Country -  
FREPASO), which obtained 29 per­
cent of the presidential votes and 
elected 29 deputies, although it did 
not win any governorship. Other 
smaller political groups and coali­
tions, with the exception of a few 
provincial parties with strong local 
support, perform ed poorly and 
failed to win any congressional seats.
The May 1995 election ratified a 
majority of the electorate’s prefer­
ence for Menem and the PJ, who 
were perceived as the guarantors of 
economic stability and social peace. 
The results also confirmed the con­
tinuous electoral decline of the UCR, 
resulting partially from a collective 
memory of hyperinflation, social tur­
moil and political instability that 
characterized Alfonsin’s final months 
as president. Moreover, the UCR’s 
poor performance resulted from 
voter rejection of the agreement 
reached between Alfonsin and 
Menem on the constitutional reform
which had eroded the party’s image 
as an opposition force.
The electoral emergence of 
FREPASO, a coalition of center-left 
parties, is noteworthy for two rea­
sons. First, it marked the end of the 
long period of Radical-Peronist bipar­
tisan electoral predominance.
Second, a significant portion of the 
population, dissatisfied with Menem's 
policies and practices, was looking 
for new political alternatives that 
promised less orthodox economic 
programs, more progressive social 
policies, and the elimination of gov­
ernmental corruption. FREPASO 
filled that void.
In this context, Menem counted 
on a num ber of positive factors to 
secure the success of his second 
administration. Politically, he relied 
on his popularity, control of the PJ, 
influence over a congressional major­
ity and most provincial authorities, 
and the relative weakness and divi­
sions of the opposition. Economical­
ly, there was substantial support for 
the economic program implemented 
since 1991 by Menem and his minis­
ter of economy, Domingo Cavallo, 
which eliminated inflation and 
promised to generate renewed eco­
nomic growth and modernization.
The administration also counted 
on a favorable international climate 
as relations with the United States, 
Western Europe (including Great 
Britain) and the rest of Latin 
America remained friendly and coop­
erative. Finally, the relative consoli­
dation of the democratic regime, 
demonstrated by the absence of any 
military or civilian threats to political 
stability, created an unprecedented 
opportunity to complete the political 
economic restructuring that Menem 
had championed since 1989 -  the
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development of a free market econo­
my and the strengthening of liberal 
democracy.
U n a n t ic ip a t e d  Q u a n d a r ie s
The auspicious circumstances sur­
rounding M enem’s second coming 
were soon affected by international 
and domestic developments that test­
ed the administration’s competence 
and lessened its popularity. Since 
early 1995, the Argentine economy 
felt the reverberations of the 
Mexican economic crisis -  the so- 
called “Tequila Effect” -  that led to 
the outflow of capital, inability to 
attract new financial flows, declining 
reserves, plummeting of the stock 
market, rise of interest rates and a 
deepening recession. By May 1995, 
the domestic situation deteriorated 
as credit and consumption fell, 
unemployment grew and fiscal crises 
began to affect many of the provin­
cial governments.
Paradoxically, this cridcal situation 
enhanced M enem’s electoral chances 
as most voters trusted his and 
Cavallo’s capacity to overcome the 
difficulties. Based on the 1989 
hyperinflationary experience, most 
voters still questioned the Radicals’ 
economic aptitude and doubted that 
a FREPASO administration would 
have the necessary expertise.
At the time of M enem’s second 
inauguration in July 1995, the 
expected recovery had not material­
ized and the socioeconomic crisis 
had worsened. Unemployment 
reached a record 18.6 percent, with 
some of the largest urban areas 
going over 20 percent, while another 
11.4 percent of the economically 
active population remained under­
employed. Interest rates remained 
very high, fluctuating between 16
percent and 23 percent. Consump­
tion plummeted, with sales declining 
35 percent compared to the first 
semester of 1994 and commercial 
bankruptcies escalating. Many 
provincial administrations were 
unable to pay salaries. Central Bank 
reserves continued to decline while 
the capital outflow persisted as more 
than $8 billion in bank deposits fled 
the country in the first half of the 
year. Economic projections anticipat­
ed that the economy would contract 
by 1 percent in 1995, and zero 
growth could be expected in 1996.
Government attempts to deal with 
the crisis by reducing employers’ 
social security contributions and 
taxes on foreign investment, lowering 
the banks’ reserve requirements, 
increasing unemployment subsidies 
and coverage, and expanding some 
social programs were not enough to 
reverse the trend. The impact of 
these measures was limited by 
Cavallo’s decision to preserve the 
convertibility program and not deval­
uate the peso, maintain a fiscal sur­
plus to pay the public debt, and his 
refusal to transfer funds to the 
provincial governments. As a result, 
the expectations of economic recov­
ery remained focused on the 
prospects of attracting new inflows of 
capital, a possibility that did not 
materialize as foreign investors 
remained reluctant and Argentina’s 
international credit rating dropped.
The uncertainty concerning the 
country’s economic prospects was 
heightened by a num ber of provin­
cial demonstrations and riots involv­
ing public employees who dem anded 
payment and rejected cuts in their 
salaries, strikes and demonstrations 
against unemployment, and rumors 
of disagreements between Menem
and Cavallo that could lead to the lat- 
ter’s resignation. The crisis became 
more acute when the administra­
tion’s internal disagreements led to 
public attacks against Cavallo’s eco­
nomic and social policies by other 
members of the cabinet, Peronist leg­
islators and ambassadors, and the 
governor of Buenos Aires province 
and M enem’s expected political heir, 
Eduardo Duhalde.
Cavallo reacted by denouncing the 
involvement of some of his critics in 
governmental corruption and their 
participation in organized “mafias” 
which solicited kickbacks and bribes 
and engaged in extortion, influence 
peddling and money laundering. 
Soon the antagonists became aware 
of the potential political and eco­
nomic costs associated with this strife 
and tried to downplay the severity of 
the accusations. Menem attempted 
to calm the situation, calling for a 
truce and ratifying his confidence in 
Cavallo and the economic plan. It 
was too late, however, to contain the 
negative fallout of the confrontation.
The aftermath of the quarrel 
included an intensification of the 
administration’s internal disputes, 
growing concern with corruption, a 
decline of public confidence in the 
administration, and continuous 
doubts on the part of foreign 
investors and lenders about the sta­
bility of Cavallo and his economic 
program.
S e t b a c k s  a n d  T e n s io n s
Under these circumstances,
Menem lost some of the support that 
he had rallied at the time of his sec­
ond inaugural. Public opinion polls 
indicated that Cavallo’s image 
improved as a result of his attacks on 
corruption -  but Menem, his cabinet
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and the Peronist party suffered a 
significant decline in popularity.
The political risks resulting from 
this situation were com pounded by 
the fact that a num ber of guberna­
torial, runoff and complementary 
elections were scheduled before the 
end of 1995.
In August, the gubernatorial elec­
tions in the province of Santa Fe 
ended in a scandal as candidates of 
different Peronist factions and the 
opposition denounced fraud and 
called for a new vote. In Tierra del 
Fuego and Neuquen, provincial par­
ties won the respective governor­
ships. The PJ lost the municipal 
elections in some of the largest 
urban centers, such as Rosario and 
Cordoba, and in several smaller 
provincial cities.
The most severe setback occurred 
in early October 1995 in the senato­
rial election held in the federal cap­
ital and the runoff gubernatorial 
election in Chaco province. In the 
federal district -  the city of Buenos 
Aires -  Graciela Fernandez Meijide, 
the FREPASO candidate, leader of 
the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo and 
hum an rights activist, won by a land­
slide, carrying all the electoral 
precincts. Second place was carried 
by the UCR. The Peronist candi­
date, Antonio E. Gonzalez, a form er 
minister of economics and defense 
and close friend of Menem, finished 
a distant third. Although the 
Peronist defeat was not a complete 
surprise due to the long history of 
porteno support for opposition can­
didates, most striking was the differ­
ence in the num ber of votes. Even 
more ominous, from the administra­
tion’s perspective, was the defeat in 
Chaco -  the form er province of 
President Peron and a traditional 
stronghold of Peronism -  where a 
Radical politician won the runoff 
vote against the PJ candidate. In 
both cases, post-election polls indi­
cated that the crucial factors influ­
encing voters was concern over cor­
ruption and unemployment.
While these negative political 
developments unfolded, the Menem 
administration confronted growing 
social unrest, particularly in the 
provinces. In Cordoba, Jujuy, 
Mendoza, Rio Negro, Salta and San 
Juan, public employees, teachers and 
other workers clashed with police as 
demonstrations called to resist salary 
cuts, dismissals and payment delays 
ended in riots. At the same time, the 
pro-Menem General Confederation 
of Labor dem anded solutions to the 
unemployment problem in an 
attem pt to retain control over the 
workers and contain the demonstra­
tions against the economic policies 
organized by two labor confedera­
tions that remained in the opposi­
tion.
N e w  C h a l l e n g e s
Confronted with these problems, 
Menem attem pted to regain control 
over the situation by minimizing 
internal strife, distancing himself 
from corruption, trying to reestab­
lish foreign confidence in his admin­
istration, and making some conces­
sions in terms of income and social 
policies. After ordering his collabo­
rators to cease their quarrels,
Menem blamed the press for having 
created a false image of dissension. 
Meanwhile, some officials who were 
accused of corruption -  such as 
those in the National Bank -  were 
dismissed and others -  such as the 
authorities of the taxation agency 
and the postal service -  became the 
target of congressional and judicial 
investigations.
In October 1995, to regain foreign 
economic confidence, Menem trav­
elled to the United States, where he 
assured business audiences that the 
economic program would not be 
modified and that Cavallo would not 
be replaced. Back home, in an 
attem pt to defuse social tensions, 
Menem also met with labor represen­
tatives, promising to preserve the 
union’s role in providing health ser­
vices, to increase employer contribu­
tions to the unions’ social service 
programs, and to protect real wages.
Some of these moves tend to con­
tradict each other and may not help 
to solve the problems. The confir­
mation of most appointed officials 
makes it inevitable that internal dis­
putes will once again arise and con­
tinue to weaken the administration. 
The dismissal of those involved in 
blatant corruption and the investiga­
tions underway could expose new 
scandals and generate growing dis­
trust among the public. The preser­
vation of Cavallo and his policies 
could deepen the recession and fur­
ther discourage foreign capital from 
returning to the country. The fulfill­
m ent of the promises made to labor 
groups may reduce profits and rein­
force the reluctance of domestic and 
foreign actors to expand their eco­
nomic activities while perpetuating 
the recession.
Nevertheless, it is important to 
remem ber that Menem has dem on­
strated an uncanny ability to over­
come political and socioeconomic 
difficulties that would have ruined 
other presidents’ popularity or even 
caused their removal. The economic 
emergencies of 1989 and 1991 were 
successfully overcome; scandals such 
as the laundering of drug money and 
bribes dem anded from foreign com­
panies by M enem’s relatives and asso­
ciates have been disregarded; politi­
cal backlashes and electoral setbacks 
have proved to be temporary, and 
past social explosions have been con­
tained. Thanks to a combination of 
political dexterity with a good dose 
of fortune and opposition weakness­
es, Menem was able to regain politi­
cal control and return to center 
stage in better condition than before. 
Thus, if past experience is a reliable 
indicator, the second Menem admin­
istration may repeat the pattern of 
the first term. With economic and 
social events often taking Menem to 
the brink of a political abyss, he may 
still come back strengthened in his 
authority and popularity. ■
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Journeys North
Clifford E. Griffin
Post-War Caribbean Migration to 
Britain: The Unfinished Cycle
By Margaret Byron 
Aldershot, England: Ashgate 
Publishing, Ltd., 1994, pp. 221.
Pilgrims From the Sun: West 
Indian Migration to America
By Ransford W. Palmer 
New York: Twayne Publishers,
1995, pp. 101
T
hese books continue 
the exploration of 
Caribbean migration 
and offer insights into 
this phenom enon by 
focusing respectively on 
the post-war migration of Caribbean 
nationals to the United Kingdom 
and to the U nited States.
Post-war Caribbean Migration to 
Britain analyzes the origins, motiva­
tions, strategies, and levels of suc­
cess of a special category of 
migrants -  non-recruited labor 
migrants -  from the island of Nevis, 
who emigrated to Britain during the 
post-war years. The study is rich in 
anecdotes from interviews with a 
num ber of these migrants, which 
provide many insights into the 
migration ordeal. Many readers 
would recognize that these experi­
ences are not specific to Nevisian 
migrants but reflect those of 
Jamaicans, St. Lucians, and other 
Caribbean sojourners as well. These 
insights are obtained through an 
analysis of issues including occupa-
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tional opportunities and mobility, 
interpersonal relationships, hous­
ing, gender, and the im portance of 
social networks.
Byron’s central argum ent is that 
non-recruited migration has evolved 
into a major survival strategy for 
Caribbean individuals and families. 
This developm ent is the result of a 
“migration ideology,” which is inher­
ited and perpetuated by generations 
of Caribbean people. This ideology 
“comprises the goals and attitudes 
towards migration, which, often 
unconsciously as far as the migrants 
are concerned, assist the smooth 
flow of a supply of labor to indus­
tries in the core countries.” Byron 
demonstrates this “migration ideolo­
gy” by drawing upon 1987 survey 
data of Nevisian schoolchildren 
ranging in age from 11 to 19 years 
old. One conclusion drawn from 
the overall survey is that migration 
is both glamorized and institutional­
ized as a survival and advancement 
option and, therefore, produces a 
“latent” supply of m igrant labor for 
richer countries.
Given this propensity to migrate, 
which is a product of Caribbean his­
tory, several propositions are 
advanced to explain some of the 
dynamics of non-recruited migra­
tion. First, social networks are 
essential structures in facilitating 
the process of non-recruited migra­
tion. Second, these networks repro­
duce exploitation of migrants by 
avoiding or minimizing the provi­
sion of essential services for the 
migrants. Third, migrants are 
unlikely to achieve their desired 
goals due to constraints imposed 
upon them  by the system and the 
contexts in which they live in 
Britain.
E W
The centrality of social networks is 
aptly dem onstrated in this analysis. 
Essentially, social networks act as an 
organizing force in facilitating 
non-recruited migration and 
migrants’ goals in the face of restric­
tive structures. Such underem pha­
sis has created a distorted picture of 
Caribbean migrants as a disorga­
nized and disunited group. This 
book counters that perspective.
Finally, in addressing the prob­
lematic subject of return  migration, 
Byron analyzes several variables that 
influence the decision to return  
home. They include the im por­
tance of the return  elem ent in the 
migrant calculus, conditions under 
which re tu rn  migration is likely, 
conditions and factors likely to pre­
vent return, and the effect on local 
economic, family and cultural sys­
tems of the return  movement. 
Post-War Caribbean Migration to 
Britain goes beyond George 
Gmelch's Double Passage: The Lives of 
Caribbean Migrants Abroad and Back 
Home (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1992), by anchoring 
itself in a strong theoretical frame­
work and providing fresh insights 
into the study of Caribbean migra­
tion.
Pilgrims From the Sun, which is 
much broader in scope, attempts to 
explain a second wave of migration, 
that of large num bers of people 
from the Anglophone Caribbean to 
the U nited States. The period of 
analysis begins during the early 
1960s in the wake of two events: the 
implementation of Britain’s new 
and highly restrictive immigration 
policy and the movement toward 
independence by then British 
colonies. Coincident with these 
events was the economic boom in
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the United Sates and a liberalization 
of U.S. immigration laws in 1965. 
This largely economic analysis 
assesses some of the collateral 
impacts of migration on both the 
sending countries and the United 
States, in general, and Kings County 
(Brooklyn) in the state of New York 
in particular. The central proposi­
tion is that Caribbean migration to 
the U nited States is driven primarily 
by economics, and that accelerated 
growth is the antidote to this 
propensity to migrate.
Palmer advances two general 
arguments. First, migration has 
benefitted the United States much 
more than the sending countries, 
largely because of the resulting 
brain drain. The point seems 
rather obvious since existing theo­
ries contend that highly skilled, 
gainfully employed individuals are 
highly likely to migrate. Earnings at 
home enable them  to set aside 
enough money to m eet the chal­
lenge of resettling and securing 
employment in the host country. 
Palmer shows the extent to which 
governments in the Anglophone 
Caribbean indeed have subsidized 
economic developm ent in the 
United States by providing a con­
stant supply of highly trained per­
sonnel such as doctors and nurses. 
The United States siphons off these 
skills by wage inducem ents and by 
providing those trained in the U.S. 
with the chance for perm anent resi­
dency. U.S. immigration policy of 
reuniting families is also a factor.
Palmer views this pattern of 
migration as essentially the result of 
“push-pull” economic factors, and 
attributes little, if any, to other 
“push” factors such as politics.
Politics precipitated increased emi­
gration from Guyana during the 
Burnham  era; from Trinidad and 
Tobago following the Black Power 
Riots in 1970; from Jamaica in the 
1970s during Michael Manley’s first 
tenure; from Grenada toward the 
end of the Gairy period; and also 
from Grenada during the rule of 
the People’s Revolutionary 
Government. Moreover, a signifi­
cant num ber of migrants are highly 
skilled/educated people and often 
formidable political opponents in 
several countries where their 
involvement in politics often leads 
to politically volatility. Thus, immi­
gration contributes to political sta­
bility by providing an escape valve 
for political discontents.
Second, Palmer contends that 
migrants from the Anglophone 
Caribbean and their offspring who 
are born in the U.S. have been 
more successful at realizing the 
American dream  -  at least economi­
cally and educationally -  than have 
African-Americans. Unfortunately, 
no comparative data on num bers of 
college graduates or any such indi­
cators are provided to substantiate 
this claim. Afro-Caribbeans, howev­
er, have not been as successful as 
African-Americans in translating 
their economic and educational suc­
cesses into political power. For 
example, the ratio of Caribbean- 
Americans to African-Americans in 
political office (city, county, state, 
and federal government) is quite 
small.
The danger of Palm er’s argum ent 
is that it supports those who wish to 
keep the black community divided 
and powerless. Such people claim 
that African-Americans are lazy and 
shiftless, and are wedded to welfare. 
Palmer facilitates this by arguing
that “the majority of the West 
Indians in Brooklyn live in black 
enclaves and rarely interact social­
ly with the white population... 
have m aintained an ethnic identi­
ty separate from the rest of the 
black population... beyond the 
work place, they strive to maintain 
their West Indianness and there­
fore their separate cultural identi­
ty” (p.20). But, continues Palmer, 
“while West Indians strive to main­
tain their ethnic and cultural 
identity in America, their socioe­
conomic success depends on the 
larger black population” (p.21). 
Clearly, the presence of such an 
homogenized community pro­
vides the researcher with the 
opportunity to collect quantitative 
and qualitative data about the 
experiences of these migrants.
Thus, while Pilgrims From the Sun 
is timely, it appears to have bitten 
off more than it can chew. It is 
not grounded in any coherent 
theoretical framework. The read­
er is given no overall statem ent of 
purpose and methodology; nei­
ther is the reader given any 
insights into why this is an impor­
tant and instructive study. The 
study tries too hard to “prove” the 
economic linkage between migra­
tion decisions and economic 
grow th/developm ent in the 
Anglophone Caribbean and 
understates the im portance of 
o ther contributory factors. These 
include political factors as well as 
what could be described as a nat­
ural propensity am ong people 
from the Caribbean to migrate. 
Caribbean people migrate 
because it is the thing to do. At 
the same time, while issues such 
as recruited, unrecruited  and ille-
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gal migrants; the role of remit­
tances; the relationship between 
migration, employment, occupa­
tion, and trade; and “counterm igra­
tion” are addressed, they are only 
glossed over in this 101-page vol­
ume.
The author commits the fallacy of 
the single cause by attem pting to 
extrapolate from the single case 
results of his study. According to 
Palmer, “because Jam aica has the 
largest population of all the 
English-speaking Caribbean coun­
tries, it is used to illustrate the eco­
nomic impact of the closing and 
opening of the population escape 
valve” (p. 14). Geography and pop­
ulation size are not sufficient to 
explain the economic impact of 
migration policy. Economic 
base/structure is a critical factor. 
Trinidad and Tobago, for example, 
has always had a more diversified 
and robust economy than Jamaica, 
and more migration alternatives 
because of this and close geographi­
cal and cultural connections with 
the South American mainland. 
Finally, no m ention is m ade of the 
U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, 
the destinations of many migrants 
from eastern Caribbean islands such 
as Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis, and St. 
Lucia.
Palmer claims that “a plausible 
argum ent can also be made that 
migration, especially the migration 
of skilled people, accelerated the 
economic decline of Jam aica by 
depriving the productive units of 
the economy of productive skills. 
This led to the underutilization of 
plant capacity... As a consequence, 
the productive base of the economy 
shrunk... the tax base also shrunk.” 
The question is, what caused this 
emigration of skills? Manley’s 
democratic socialist policies 
angered the United States, which 
pressured the International 
Monetary Fund to withhold loans to 
the governm ent of Jamaica. At the 
same time, not only did B urnham ’s
misguided policies and his choice 
of a cooperative socialist path to 
developm ent contribute to prob­
lems in Guyana, major Western 
countries did no t embrace him 
either. Hence, it is simplistic to 
attribute Jam aica’s (and the 
Anglophone Caribbean’s) econom ­
ic decline to emigration, rather 
than see em igration as a rational 
response to external forces as well 
as domestic politics.
In describing the political behav­
ior of Caribbean nationals in 
Hartford, Connecticut, Palm er pre­
sents the following argum ent, 
which represents a huge leap of 
logic: “The hard work and earnest­
ness that have shaped their eco­
nomic success have also shaped the 
political orientation of their lead­
ers. The only West Indian to be
America/Americas
Myth in the Making of U.S. Policy Toward 
Latin America
ELDON KENWORTHY
“Kenworthy’s first-rate study of Reagan’s policies in 
nicaragua rem inds us that even when the em peror 
has no clothes he rem ains well wrapped in myth and 
deception. Equally persuasively, America/Americas 
argues that these policies were rooted in a misleading 
view of the hem isphere that was firmly established 
before the Cold War and continues to  dominate 
W ashington’s thinking today.” —Richard Fagen 
206 pages 7 illustrations cloth: $35.00 paper: $14.95
On Humane Governance
Toward a New Global Politics 
RICHARD FALK
In this volume commissioned by the World O rder 
Models Project (WOMP), Falk provides a visionary 
account o f the potential for global governance in the 
new world order based on respect for hum an rights 
and  international law, nonviolence, democracy, envi­
ronm ental balance, and  planetary unity.
304 pages cloth: $45.00 paper: $16.95 
For sale in the U.S. and Canada only
elected to the H artford City 
Council, Colin Bennett, ran as a 
Republican and was elected four 
times. And the president of the 
H artford chapter of the Jam aica 
Progressive League... is also a 
Republican. There appears to be a 
right of center drift in the politics 
of this m iddle class community.” 
The author provides no data to 
show the political orientation of 
this Caribbean community. N either 
is there any evidence that the 
Caribbean community voted for 
Bennett. Even if they did, did they 
vote for him  because they, like him, 
are Republicans, or simply because 
he is from the Caribbean? In sum, 
Pilgrims From the Sun does not offer 
any new perspectives on this im por­
tant aspect of the Caribbean 
reality. ■
Organizing Civil Society
The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for 
Democracy in Chile
PHILIP D.OXHORN
“O xhorn 's  study is 
a model o f scholarly 
work, a thoughtful 
and  well-argued treat­
m ent o f popular or­
ganizations tha t will 
challenge students of 
social m ovem ents,
Chilean politics, and 
Latin America politics 
generally for years to com e.” —M ichael Fleet, 
M arquette University 
390 pages cloth: $55.00 paper: $18.95
Available in bookstores, or from
PENN STATE PRESS
820 North University Drive 
University Park, PA 16802-1003 
Orders: 1-800-326-9180
r E I f  STATE T R E SS J
ORGANIZING 
CIVIL SOCIETY
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United States 
Policy in Latin 
America
A Decade of Crisis 
and Challenge 
EDITED BY 
JOHN D, MARTZ 
About the previous 
edition: “A gem, an 
authoritative handbook 
on U.S. policy focusing 
on the crucial conflicts 
of the past twenty-five 
years.”—Foreign Affairs 
This completely new 
work retains the best 
features of that popular 
earlier volume. Thirteen 
experts survey U.S. 
policy for the past 
decade on topics of 
relevance to Latin 
America (such as trade, 
drugs, immigration, and 
armed insurrection).
$25 paper/$55 cloth
Latin American 
Studies Series
The New Latin 
American Mission 
History
EDITED BY ERICK 
LANGER AND 
ROBERT H. JACKSON 
The new mission 
historians examine 
cases from throughout 
the hemisphere— from 
the Andes to northern 
Mexico to California— in 
an effort to find patterns 
in the contact between 
the European mission­
aries and the various 
societies they 
encountered.
$16.95 paper/$35 cloth
University of Nebraska Press Lincoln NE • 800-755-1105
Engendering 
Latin America
Women, Feminism, 
and Social Change 
in Argentina, Chile, 
and Uruguay, 
1890-1940
ASUNCION LAVRIN 
Asuncion Lavrin 
recounts changes in 
gender relations and the 
role of women in each of 
the three countries, 
thereby contributing an 
enormous amount of 
new information and 
incisive analysis to the 
histories of Argentina, 
Chile, and Uruguay.
$60 cloth
Sex and Danger in 
Buenos Aires
Prostitution, Family, 
and Nation in Argentina 
DONNA J. GUY 
“The author’s goal— to 
show the ‘relationship of 
female sexual commerce 
to family, class, and 
nation’— is realized in a 
very readable analysis of 
mid-nineteenth- to mid- 
twentieth-century 
Argentina from the 
perspective of the 
underworld of prosti­
tutes, bordellos, and 
international white 
slavery rings.’’
— Hispanic American 
Historical Review 
$12 paper
The Struggle 
for Democracy 
in Chile
Revised Edition 
EDITED BY 
PAUL W. DRAKE 
AND IVAN JAKSSC 
About the first edition:
“A first-rate and timely 
anthology that en­
hances the reader’s 
understanding of the 
prolonged and difficult 
transition to civilian 
rule in Chile. All 
students of Chile and 
current Latin American 
politics will find this book 
valuable.”
— The Americas 
$22.50 paper
P U B L I C A T I 
Through the Lens
M arian Goslinga
P
hotographic archives 
and collections consti­
tute im portant legacies 
and have increasingly 
becom e a focal point 
for research. 
Photography, as a discipline by 
itself, has also attained a 
respectable standing and, in recent 
years, has drawn many adherents 
to its cause. In 1992, Edward 
Ranney published a survey of 
recent photobooks specifically 
dealing with Latin America in 
which he sum m arized the existing 
literature on both  aspects of the 
subject (Latin American Research 
Review, v. 26, no. 3, Sum m er 1991, 
pp. 235-246). Ranney’s work was 
brough t up to date by Wendy 
Watriss and Lois Zam ora (eds.) in 
their Image and Memory: Latin 
American Photography, 1865-1992, 
published by Rice University Press 
(H ouston, Texas) in 1994. This 
bibliography will start where 
Ranney, Watriss and Zam ora left 
off, listing materials published 
within the last three years -  1993 
to mid-1995. Included will be 
items covering the entire region, 
individual countries -  Mexico pro­
viding the most entries -  as well as 
works on individual photographers 
(i.e. Guillerm o Kahlo, M ariana 
Yampolsky, M anuel Alvarez Bravo, 
Graciela Iturbide, Flor Garduno, 
etc.). It is noteworthy that am ong 
the leading Latin Am erican pho­
tographers o f today, women make 
up the majority.
Marian Goslinga is the Latin American 
and Caribbean librarian at Florida 
International University.
A ciento cincuenta arios de la 
fotografia. Felicitas Luna, ed. Todo 
es Historia, vol. 27, no. 313 (August 
1993), pp. 92. [Proceedings of the 
second Congreso de la Fotografia 
Argentina, 1839-1939.]
Album de familia. Myriam Lins de 
Barros, liana Strozenberg. Rio de 
Janeiro: Comunicacao 
Contem poranea; 1993. 123 pp. 
[Collection of family portraits from 
Brazil.]
Alexandra Edwards. Ilona Katzew. 
Review, no. 48 (Spring 1994), pp. 82- 
84. [Recent work from the Chilean 
photographer.]
Ambra Polidor. Mary Schneider 
Enriquez. Art News (Special issue
1995), pp. 147. [Works by the con­
tem porary Mexican photographer]
American voices: Cuban, Chicano 
and Puerto Rican Photographers in 
FotoFest ‘94. Fernando Castro. Art 
Nexus, no. 16 (A pril-June 1995), 
pp. 70-74. [Photographs from an 
exhibition held in Houston, Texas.]
Argentina: The Great Estancias.
Juan  Pablo Queiroz, Tomas de Elia, 
eds; Tomas de Elia, Cristina 
Cassinelli de Corral, photographers. 
New York, NY: Rizzoli; 1995.
[Mostly photographs.]
Arquitectura de Mexico: fotografias 
de Juan Rulfo. Mexico, DF:
Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y 
las Artes; 1994. 24 pp.
Avatares de la obra del fotografo 
peruano Martin Chambi (1891- 
1973) y resena de dos monografias 
recientes. Jorge Heredia. Hueso
Humero, no. 29 (May 1993), pp. 144- 
173.
The Chiapa Photography Project: 
Photos from Sister Carlota Duarte’s 
Book Odella, A Hidden Survivor.
America, vol. 171, no. 20 (December 
31, 1994), pp. 22-24.
Cuban Photography: Context and 
Meaning. John  Mraz. History of 
Photography, vol. 18 (Spring 1994), 
pp. 87-96.
Desires and Disguises: Five Latin 
American Photographers. Amanda 
Hopkinson, ed. and trans. London: 
Serpent’s Tail; 1994. 80 pp.
Early Twentieth Century Peruvian 
Photography. Cheryl Hartup. Latin 
American Art, vol. 5, no. 2 (Summer 
1993), pp. 60-62.
Eugenia Vargas: el proscenio 
inevitable. Roberto Tejada, Paloma 
Diaz Abreu. Artes de Mexico, no. 21 
(Fall 1993), pp. 98-99. [Eugenia 
Vargas is a Mexican photographer.]
Una experiencia de investigacion en 
acervos fotograficos del siglo XIX.
Patricia Masse Zendejas. La Palabra 
y el Hombre, no. 97 (July-September
1993), pp. 117-126. [This article 
discusses research m ethods in 
Mexican photographic archives.]
The Exposure o f Light and Line: 
Photographs by Valdir Cruz.
Edward Leffmgwell. Americas, vol. 
46, no. 2 (March-April 1994), pp. 
48-53. [Valdir Cruz is a Brazilian 
photographer.]
Flor Garduno: Witnesses o f the 
Same Dream. Fernando Castro. Art
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Nexus, no. 11 (January-March 1994), 
pp. 219-222. [Flor Garduno is an 
award-winning photogapher from 
Mexico whose works are perm anent­
ly displayed in Paris and Mexico 
City.]
Fotografia ilimitada e inalcanzable.
Nelson H errera Ysla. Casa de las 
Americas, n. 193 (October-November
1993), pp. 100-110. [General dis­
cussion of Latin American photog­
raphy.]
A fotografia no Brasil do seculo 
XIX: 150 aiios de fotografo Marc 
Ferrez, 1843-1993. Pedro Vasquez, 
Gilberto Ferrez, ed. Sao Paulo:
1993. 63 pp.
Fotografia: la memoria cuestionada.
Sara Facio. Cuadernos 
Hispanoamericanos, no. 517-519 (July- 
September 1993), pp. 269-279. 
[Focuses on Argentina.]
Las fotografias de Alicia D’Amico: 
cambiando las reglas del juego.
Ester G im bernat de Gonzalez. 
Confluencia, vol. 9, no. 2 (Spring
1994), pp. 3-4. [Analyzes the work 
of the Argentine photographer.]
Fotografias para la historia de 
Puerto Rico, 1844-1952. Osvaldo 
Garcia. 2a ed. Rio Piedras, PR.: 
Ediciones Huracan; 1993. 397 pp.
Fotos mexicanas en la Casa de las 
Culturas. Annette Zinkant, Jose 
Luis Gomez y Patino, trans.
Humboldt, no. 109 (1993), pp. 96.
Franz Mayer fotografo. Jose 
Antonio Rodriguez, Erika Billeter. 
Mexico, DF: Museo Franz Mayer;
1995. 83 pp. [Franz Mayer (1882-
1975) was a nationalized Mexican 
citizen who has become well known 
as a photographer and art collector.]
Fuga mexicana: un recorrido por la 
fotografia en Mexico. Olivier 
Debroise, Elizabeth Fuentes Rojas. 
Mexico, DF: Consejo Nacional para 
la Cultura y las Artes; 1994. 223 pp.
Garciela Iturbide: fotografias.
Mexico, DF: FotoSeptiembre; 1993.
1 vol. (unpaged). [Photographs 
from an exhibition held September- 
October 1993 at the Palacio de 
Bellas Artes, Mexico City.]
Guillermo Kahlo: vida y obra -  foto­
grafo, 1872-1941. Mexico, DF: 
Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y 
las Artes, Instituto Nacional de 
Bellas Artes; 1993. 197 pp. 
[Photographs from exhibitions held 
in 1993 at the Museo Estudio Diego 
Rivero and the Museo Nacional de 
Arquitectura in Mexico City.]
Haitian Studio Photography: A hid­
den World of Images. Marilyn 
Houlbert. Aperture, n. 126 (Winter
1992), pp. 58-65.
Imagens e memorias, 1920-1930: 
italianos do Brasil. Suzana Barretto 
Ribeiro. Sao Paulo: Editora 
Brasiliense; 1994. 162 pp. 
[Photographs of Italian immigrants 
in Sao Paolo, Brazil.]
James Key: en busca del placer de la 
luz. Fermln Ramirez. Plural 
(Mexico), vol. 23, no. 279 
(December 1994), pp. 40-47.
Juan Rodrigo Llaguno: retratos.
Monterrey, Mex.: Museo de 
Monterrey; 1993. 31 leaves.
Juan Rulfo, photographe: esthetique 
du royaume des ames. Beatrice 
Tatard. Paris: L’Harm attan; 1994.
172 pp.
Life and Still-Lifes: Ramon 
Guerrero. Lynette M.F. Bosch.
Latin American Art, vol. 5 n. 4 
(1994), pp. 57-61. [Works by the 
Hispanic-American photographer 
who died in 1994.]
Lola Alvarez Bravo: fotografias 
selectas, 1934-1985. Lucia Garcla- 
Noriega y Nieto et al., eds. Mexico, 
DF: Centro Cultural/A rte 
Contem poraneo; 1993. 449 pp.
[A selection of works from the 
Mexican photographer (1907- 
1993).]
Lola Alvarez Bravo: la luz en el 
espejo. Sergio Gonzalez Rodriguez. 
Nexos, vol. 16, no. 190 (October
1993), pp. 16-20.
Lourdes Almeida y el mito como 
escritura fotografica. Jose Antonio 
Rodriguez. Artes de Mexico, no. 22 
(W inter 1993-1994), pp. 109-111.
Luis Gonzalez Palma: los ilumina- 
dos. Fernando Castro. Art Nexus, 
no. 7 (January-March 1993), pp. 
136-138. [Gonzalez Palma is a pho­
tographer from Guatemala.]
Manos poderosas: The Photography 
of Graciela Ituribide. Elizabeth 
Ferrer. Review, no. 47 (Fall 1993), 
pp. 69-78.
Marcos Lopez: fotografias. Sara 
Facio, ed. Buenos Aires: Azotea 
Editorial Fotografica; 1993. 75 pp. 
[Portraits by the Argentine photog­
rapher.]
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Nuevo espacio de la fotografia: cen­
tra de la imagen. Leon or Lara de la 
Fuente. Artes de Mexico, no. 26 
(September-October 1994), pp. 86- 
87.
Nuevo Leon: el paisaje y su espejo.
Abraham Nuncio, ed. Monterrey, 
Mex.: Gobierno del Estado de 
Nuevo Leon, Coordinacion de 
Publicaciones y Proyectos 
Especiales; 199S. 153 p. [Catalog 
of recent photographs and paint­
ings.]
El ojo de vidrio: cien anos de 
fotografia del Mexico indio. Jaime 
Velez Storey et al, eds. Mexico, DF: 
Banco de Mexico; 1993. 191 p.
Los ojos de la luna. Victor Flores 
Olea. Mexico, DF: Miguel Angel 
Porrua G rupo Editorial; 1994. 81 
pp. [Mexico City in photgraphs.]
Over 70 Years o f Photography in 
Mexico. Business Mexico, vol. 4, no.
4 (April 1994), pp. 37.
Retratos de familia: Leitura de 
fotografia historica. Miriam 
Moreira Leite. Sao Paulo: Editora 
de Universidade de Sao Paulo; 1993. 
192 pp. [Collection of family pho­
tographs from Brazil.]
Revelations. Carlos Jimenez. Art 
Nexus, no. 15 (January-March 1995), 
pp. 116-117. [Exhibition of 
Colombian photographs held at the 
La Tertulia Museum, Cali.]
Rogelio Cuellar: el sentido de una 
mirada. Jose Manuel Springer.
Artes de Mexico, no. 22 (Winter 1993-
1994), pp. 112-113. [Cuellar is a 
Mexican photogrpaher.]
Romper los margenes. Encuentro 
de Fotografia Latinoamericana 
(1993, Caracas); Jose Antonio 
Navarrete, ed. Caracas: Museo de 
Artes Visuales Alejandro Otero;
1994. 154 pp. [Based on an exhibi­
tion held November 22, 1993- 
January 23, 1994 at the Museo de 
Artes Visuales Alejandro Otero, 
Caracas.]
Sexto Bienal de Fotografia: Centro 
de la Imagen, abril-mayo, 1994, 
Plaza de la Ciudadela, Mexico.
Mexico DF: Consejo Nacional para 
la Cultura y las Artes, Instituto 
Nacional de Bellas Artes; 1994. 300 
pp.
A Shadow Born of Earth: New 
Photography in Mexico. Elizabeth 
Ferrer. New York, NY: American 
Federation of Arts in association 
with Universe Publishing; 1993. 143 
pp.
Los sortilegios de la mirada: la 
fotografia de Mariana Yampolsky.
Majorie Agosin. Fem, vol. 18, no.
136 (June 1994), pp. 42-45.
Tecnicas y trucos de nuestros foto- 
grafos. Federico B. Kirbus. Todo es 
Historia, vol. 26, no. 309 (April
1993), pp. 74-78. [About 
Argentina.]
Tina Modotti: A Fragile Life.
Mildred Constantine. New ed. San 
Francisco, CA: Chronicle Books; 
1993. 194 pp. [Biography of the 
Mexican photographer (1896- 
1942).]
Tina Modotti: Photographs. Sarah 
M. Lowe, ed. New York, NY: H.N. 
Abrams in association with the 
Philadelphia Museum of Art; 1995. 
160 pp.
Veinte fotografos del siglo XIX.
Amparo Gomez Tepexicuapan. 
Mexico, DF: Instituto Nacional de 
Antropologia e Historia; 1994. 59 
pp. [Selections from the exhibition 
FotoSeptiembre 1994.]
Yesterday’s Modern Images, Today’s 
Archival Treasures. Daniel Buck. 
Americas, vol. 46, no. 5 (September- 
October 1994), pp. 21-27. [19th- 
century Bolivian photography.] ■
T H E
Southeast Museum 
of Photography
Serving the South, 
the Caribbean & the World
SPECIAL INTEREST PUBLICATIONS AVAILABLE:
Latino America: Photographs by Cecilia Arboleda -  $3.00
Black Totems/Totems Negros:
Photographs by Maria Martinez Canas -  $10.00
(Please add $2.00 for postage and handling)
Southeast Museum of Photography
1200 West International Speedway Boulevard, Daytona Beach, Florida 32114
Museum Hours: Tuesday - Friday: 10 - 3, Tuesday: 5 - 7, Saturday & Sunday: 1 - 4 
Admission is always free. For more information call: (904) 254-4475
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